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Just as it led the philosophy of science to gravitate around scientific practice, the abandonment of 
all foundationalist aspirations has already begun making political philosophy into an attentive 
observer of the new ways in which constitutional law is practiced. Yet paradoxically, lawyers and 
legal scholars are not those who understand this the most clearly. Beyond analyzing the 
jurisprudence that has emerged from the expansion of constitutional justice, and taking into 
account the development of international and regional law, the ongoing globalization of 
constitutional law requires comparing the constitutional laws of individual nations. Following 
Waldron, the product of this new legal science can be considered as ius gentium. This legal 
science is not as well established as one might like to think. But it can be developed on the 
grounds of the practice that consists in ascertaining standards. As abstract types of best 
“practices” (and especially norms) of constitutional law from around the world, these are only a 
source of law in a substantive, not a formal, sense. They thus belong to what I should like to call 
a “second order legal positivity.” In this article I will undertake, both at a methodological and an 
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Just as it led the philosophy of science to gravitate around scientific practice, the abandonment of 
all foundationalist aspirations has already begun making political philosophy into an attentive 
observer of the new ways in which constitutional law is practiced. The new science of 
constitutional law may well come to feature at the forefront of the discussions of Justice as a 
formal, paramount, and modern aspect of the Good.2 Yet paradoxically, jurists, that is, lawyers 
and legal scholars as opposed to philosophers, are not, with a few exceptions,3 those who 
understand this the most clearly.  
 
Indeed, it is still among too few of them that “Radbruch’s claim that the year 1945 was a clean 
break in the history of law, in that it put an end to the reign of a hated positivism and sounded the 
rebirth of natural law theory, is no longer accepted without qualification.”4 In any event, given 
the prevalent legal epistemology, the normative significance of the positivization of human 
rights, in international law but also in the law of multiple nations, seems destined to largely 
escape the jurists. Does a mere gain in effectiveness5 suffice to explain why it is “an undeniable 
progress” that, in the post-World War II period, positive law has begun “to perform the function 
theoretically assigned to natural law”?6 More precisely, why should we regard as progress the 
overcoming, in the last sixty years, of the opposition between natural law and (a certain 
restrictive conception of) positive law?7 Questions of this sort seem incomprehensible to jurists. 
Either they are mistaken, or they should be addressed to others.  
 
At the risk of over-generalizing, we might say that in its current state, legal science presents the 
following epistemological tryptich. It is said that, beyond the letter of the law and the cases, the 
                                                
2 See especially John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev ed (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999) at 30 and Part III: 
“Ends” [Rawls, Theory]  
3 See espeically DP Kommers, “The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law”, (1976) 9 John Marshall Journal of 
Practice & Procedure 685 at 692 (arguing that “comparative law can be helpful in the quest for a theory of the public 
good and right political order. It can represent a disinterested quest for a public philosophy and a statement of the 
rights and duties that would be assigned in a more perfect constitutional polity.”). 
4 Luc Heuschling, État de droit, Rechtsstaat, Rule of Law (Paris: Dalloz, 2002) at 32-33 (translation mine) 
(Heuschling adds that “[t]he antipositivist wave actually draws its sources in the famous methodological quarrel of 
Weimar, whose echo was indeed still heard under the Third Recih. Nazi jurists, whose discourse was not without 
some analogies to the theory of natural law which was “reborn” after 1945, tirelessly asserted the existence of an 
inextricable relationship between law and morality.”)  
5 See V Champeil-Desplats, “Effectivité et droits de l’homme : approche théorique”, in V Champeil-Desplats and 
D Lochak (eds), À la recherche de l’effectivité des droits de l’homme, (Paris: Presses universitaires de Paris 10, 
2008) 11. 
6 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Vers un droit commun de l’humanité, Conversation with Philippe Petit, 1995 (Textuel, 
2005) at 78. 
7 Ibid. 
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legal scholar, who by definition ought to possess a knowledge different from that of the legal 
practitioner, has three options: (1) to seek (more or less hopelessly) the true knowledge about law 
in any discipline, preferably an empirical one, other than law itself; (2) to resign him- or herself 
(more or less cynically) to adhere to a purely “political” conception of the law (such as 
relativism, decisionism, culturalism, existentialism, etc.); or, (3) to resolve (more or less naïvely) 
on going back to natural law, that is to say, the natural law of the philosophers, the idea of 
“philosophical foundations” of the law.  
 
Beyond analyzing the jurisprudence that has emerged from the expansion of constitutional 
justice,8 and taking into account the development of international and regional law, the ongoing 
globalization of constitutional law requires comparing the constitutional laws of individual 
nations.9 The product of this new legal science can be considered as ius gentium. Jeremy Waldron 
asks the following question: “What if [ius gentium] is largely unknown and unitelligible to those 
who pride themselves on the study of moral ideas but is studied and used by those who trained 
and pride themsleves on an understanding of law?”10 For my own part, I would answer that in 
that case, it is high time that the jurists, as bearers of this knowledge, knew better how to 
articulate, situate, embrace, spread, and draw upon it. 
 
For the moment, however, the new science of ius gentium is not as well established as one might 
like to think ― not only on the level of methodology, but also on that of epistemology. Reference 
to foreign law and more systematic comparison of laws follow a variety of logics. Sometimes 
these logics are in competition, while at other times they are situated on different levels and could 
thus be combined, were it not for the fact that they are also, most often, governed by different 
epistemologies. Even the Waldronian model of ius gentium, epistemologically well-developed 
though it is, is not free from methodological ambiguities. For this reason, in this article I will 
undertake, both at a methodological and an epistemological level, the development of a model for 
ascertaining standards.  
 
A terminological clarification is in order. As “best practices” among which we can normally 
count typologies of legal norms, the global standards of constitutional law do not fit within the 
definition of legal standards which a dictionary of legal theory might provide. When I speak of a 
global standard of constitutional law, I do not mean a “term or expression within a legal rule or 
document that requires evaluation or assessment.” The standards to which I am referring are not 
norms of positive law the contents or object of which “are only very partially legal,” which 
“manifestly draws upon benchmarks that can (or must?) be located outside the law itself,” such as 
                                                
8 O Jouanjan, “Histoire de la science du droit constitutionnel”, in M Troper et D Chagnollaud (eds), Traité 
international de droit constitutionnel, (Paris: Dalloz, 2012), vol 1, Théorie de la constitution 69 at 107. 
9 Sujit Choudhry, “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional 
Interpretation”, (1999) 74:3 Indiana LJ 819 at 821. 
10 Jeremy Waldron, “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign Law in American Courts, (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2012) at 74 [Waldron, Laws Common]. 
 5 
“local habits, custom, or simply human reason.” Nor do I mean, “more generally,” any “notion of 
the legal language with an indeterminate or variable contents,” or a “vague concept” that opens 
up, within a legal rule, an “area of indeterminacy that must be covered by an act of evaluation.”11 
Besides, as abstract types of best “practices” (and especially norms) of constitutional law from 
around the world, that is to say drawn from a multitude of systems of positive law and simplified, 
the standards with which I am concerned here are only a source of law in a substantive, not a 




Is it not somehow absurd that, even as the conditions of thought are such that political 
philosophers are increasingly finding some of their best arguments in the international and 
constitutional instruments, laws, and judicial decisions, in many countries legal scholars measure 
the “scientificity” of their scholarship by the distance that separates it from legal scholarship? 
Ever since legal systems were nationalized, the European ius commune made up of Roman and 
canon law vanished,12 and the social sciences consolidated, the legal science has been in search of 
itself. Should it become a descriptive, positive-empricial, or historical-normativist discipline? Or 
should it wander over to the pure realm of normative philosophy, even at the risk of becoming 
philosophy of law without knowledge of law?  
 
1.1 From Anti-Legal Blindness to the (Re)discovery of Law as a Science  
 
The great projects which, mostly in the last century, aimed at making law into a purely 
descriptive science all failed. The most radical theories of “law as fact” are so many illusions. 
Indeed, their principal authors all defended, either concurrently or subsequently, a conception of 
law as an essentially normative phenomenon.13 As for law as a system of positive norms, the 
scholarly study of its contents never yielded any objective science of “propositions of law” 
(Rechtssätze) as pure “Sollen” describing such norms and their relationship with facts.14 The 
positive heritage that the epistemological “great projects” of the 20th century bequeathed to the 
science of law consists mostly of the social-legal approaches, not always said to be truly 
“interdisciplinary,” whose influence on the social sciences has been largely limited to the 
economic analysis of law.15 Another of these approaches is “legal pluralism,” which is wrongly 
                                                
11 P Orianne, “Standard juridique”, in A-J Arnaud et al (eds), Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de 
sociologie du droit, 2nd ed, (Paris: LGDJ, 1993) at 581-582. 
12 RH Helmholz, “Western Canon Law”, in J Witte, Jr and FS Alexander (eds), Christianity and Law: An 
Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 71. 
13 Maxime St-Hilaire, La lutte pour la pleine reconnaissance des droits ancestraux. Problématique juridique et 
enquête philosophique, (Cowansville : Yvon Blais, forthcoming in 2015) [St-Hilaire, Lutte]. 
14 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 2nd éd (rev & enlarged) (Bekeley, CA & Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1967) at 72-73. 
15 Richard A Posner, “Symposium: Law, Knowledge, and the Academy: Legal Scholarship Today”, (2002) 115:5 
Harv L Rev 1314. 
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believed to be the starting point and the obligatory framework for any study of “interactions 
between legal orders” and whose scientifically descriptivist claims, at best, make it miss the main 
normative issues; at worst, they serve to mask a poorly-defended anti-state position.16 Faced with 
the relative impracticability of a narrowly descriptive legal scientism, the ineradicability of the 
law’s normative issues, and the horror of the Holocaust, the jurists, most often forgetting 
Nazism’s legal anti-positivism,17 have generally tended to return to natural law,18  turning 
towards philosophy or, more precisely, towards a conception of philosophy that is no longer 
sustainable. If the textbook market and university curricula which largely drive it are any 
evidence, the already outdated idea of “philosophical foundations of law” is even more popular 
among the jurists than it is among philosophers.  
 
What matter, then, that in his discussion with the “sociologist” Max Weber, whose 
epistemological and methodological work in fact postdates his own, the jurist Georg Jellinek 
should “not be considered as a sort of disciple of the great master, but as a full partner whose 
thought would, on many essential points ― the best known of which is theory of ‘type’ ― inspire 
Weber’s own work”?19 What matter that, contrary to a widespread idea, Émile Durkheim did not 
see in the law, and notably in the legal sanction, a phenomenon to be explained by sociology, so 
much as a magnificent observatory of society?20 What matter it to know that Karl Marx failed to 
acknowledge the debt which historical materialism, certainly one of the most sociological of his 
ideas, owed to the Historical school of law?21 What matter that, well before he deduced “law” 
from morals, Kant compared the “transcendental deduction” to what the jurists call the “quid 
juris,” contrasting it to the “quaestio facti”?22 What matter, indeed, that the thinker of the 
conditions of the possibility of moral knowledge and action spoke of reason as a “tribunal,” 
ultimately bringing all philosophical questions close to a quid juris? What matter that the critical 
philosophy which Kant founded and Fichte completed is “essentially legal in its method, up to 
and including in the realm of theory of knowledge?23 What matter all of this, since jurists 
continue, more or less consciously but nevertheless massively, to attribute to any “external” 
perspective on the law a perceptiveness that stands in stark contrast with the merely superficial if 
not specious knowledge thought to be the most that an “internal” perspective can possibly 
                                                
16 Maxime St-Hilaire, “The Study of Legal Plurality outside ‘Legal Pluralism’: the Future of the Discipline?”, in 
Helge Dedek and Shauna Van Praagh (eds), Stateless Law: Evolving Boundaries of a Discipline, (Ashgate, 
forthcoming in 2015). 
17 Heuschling, supra note 4. 
18 Voir Gustav Radbruch, “Gezetliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht”, (1946:1) Süddeutsches Juristen-
Zeitung 105. 
19 O Jouanjan, “Préface : Georg Jellinek ou le juriste philosophe” in Georg Jellinek, L’État moderne et son droit, 
L’État moderne et son droit, reprint, G Fardis, transl (1911-1913) (Paris: Panthéon-Assas/LGDJ, 2005) vol 1, 35. 
20 Voir Émile Durkheim, De la division du travail social (Presses Universitaires de France, 2007); David Garland, 
Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) at 23. 
21 N Levine “The German Historical School of Law and the Origins of Historical Materialism”, (1987) 48:3 J of the 
History of Ideas 431. 
22 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, JMD Meikeljohn, transl (Auckland, NZ: The Floating Press, 2007) 
at 158-60. 
23 F Fischbach, Fondement du droit naturel. Fichte, (Ellipses, 2000) at 15. 
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provide. In Canada, for instance, the public financing of university research, as well as, by way of 
consequence, the training of researchers in this area, still rely on the conclusions of the 1983 
“Arthurs Report,” a document that mostly evokes the scientistic enthusiasm of the great 
epistemological projects for the law, but which, at the same time, obeys the traditional conception 
of philosophy as the “mother of sciences.”24 
 
In some legal circles, notably within law faculties, it is thus said that jurists “should abandon any 
pretense of a distinctive and autonomous analytic method” of their own,25  and instead see what is 
available from the catalogue of “true” epistemologies. The attitude which this virtual shopping 
mall favours is that of legal relativism.26 Now, “[r]elativism is usually a dirty word. But this sense 
of law's relativity is quite settled in many people’s minds,” as Waldron too observes.27 Among 
these people are jurists who, at the same time,  
 
have their own particular approach. It is not primarily empirical, though it 
leaves room for the insertion of empirical information at various points. 
Neither is it just moral argument or advocacy. It is a method of analysis: taking 
an issue apart and reformulating it step by step as a series of conditions and 
tests that apply various nested, interlocking, and sometimes competing 
principles.28 
 
To rely on the standard-setting method to position legal science as an alternative to relativist 
sterility ― this is really my objective. Due to the way in which, starting no doubt with Bentham, 
the distinction between law and morality structures debates in legal philosophy, and more 
specifically because the first of these concepts came to be identified “with power and practice in 
the context of single, well-organized political communities, there is a tendency also to think that 
by moving outside those bounds we must be moving in the direction of natural law.”29 Yet the 
distinction between the law that is and the law that ought to be need not coincide with that 
between law and morality, notably because law is not only the product of the various positive 
systems of formal sources, but also a normative science. Thus the ascertainment of global 
standards of constitutional law belongs not to a narrow but to a broad conception of legal 
positivism. This conception posits the existence, within a space which might metaphorically be 
                                                
24 Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada (Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 
1983). 
25 Waldron, Laws Common, supra note 10, at 95. 
26 See M Mahlmann, “Human Dignity and Autonomy in Modern Constitutional Orders”, in Michel Rosenfeld and 
András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012) 370 at 375 (arguing that “[f]or many, the only intellectually respectable position is therefore one or another 
form of relativism founding normative arguments in the last instance on cultural traditions, social semantics, 
discourse formations, operations of social systems, shifting narratives, or exchangeable final languages”). 
27 Waldron, Laws Common, supra note 10, at 16.  
28 Ibid, at 93-94. 
29 Ibid, at 42. 
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located in between the philosophical “natural law” and the positive law strictly understood as the 
product of only formal sources, of what I would like to call a “second order legal positivity.”  
 
The claim that the science of constitutional law is a second order positivity is, in turn, dependent 
on the successive validity of three others, which will at times run together in the following 
section. The first is non-foundationalism ― the claim that normative thought is not “founded” on 
anything absolute that is foreign or exterior to, or, in other words, independent of, the ordinary 
experience and beliefs of human beings.30 The second is non-relativism ― the claim that neither 
the plurality of the forms of implementation of justice nor the rejection of the idea of assured 
philosophical foundations prevents the use of reason in the realm of the ought; a use which must 
henceforth consist in a coherent reconstruction of socially constituted normative intuitions, it 
being understood that all reconstructions need not be equally coherent and non-counter-intuitive, 
and thus of equal value. The third is legalism ― the claim that one of if not the most universal, 
the least counter-intuitive, the most coherent, and the most effective of such reconstructions could 
well be legal science, including the science of constitutional law, which deals with the essential 
characteristics of the political “ought” ― it being understood that this science possesses a greater 
degree of positivity than philosophy but a smaller one than positive law stricto sensu. 
 
1.2 From Reflective Normative Equilibrium to Law as Interpretive Equilibrium 
 
Martha Nussbaum explains that, although “[m]any critics of universalism in ethics are really 
critics of metaphysical realism who assume that realism is a necessary basis for universalism ..., 
this assumption is false,”31 simply because “universal ideas of the human do arise within history 
and from human experience, and can ground themselves in experience.” 32  Nussbaum 
distinguishes the modern type of scepticism from the ancient, much as Ronald Dworkin separates 
external scepticism from the internal sort (a term which he applies to the “critical legal studies” 
movement). Philosophical anti-realism does not at require, by itself, normative scepticism.33 
Indeed, Nussbaum and Dworkin are far from alone in making this claim.34 While not all those 
                                                
30 There also exists a complete version of non-foundationalism, which extends to theoretical thought. While I am 
inclined to agree with it, this article does not depend on it. On this point, see especially the works of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Willard Van Orman Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, Donald Davidson et Richard Rorty.  
31 See Martha Nussbaum, “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings”, in Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover 
(eds), Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), at 67-68. 
32 Ibid at 69. 
33 See Martha Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature and the Law” (1994) 107:3 Harv L Rev 
714; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1986) at 76-85 and 266-275 [Dworkin, 
Empire]; Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Belknap Press, 2011) at 25 (“I do reject Archimedean skepticism: 
skepticism that denies any basis for itself in morality or ethics.”) [Dworkin, Hedgehogs]. 
34 See John Rawls “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics”, (1951) 60:2 Philosophical Review 177; Thomas 
Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970) ; Simon Blackburn, Spreading 
the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Jeremy 
Waldron, “The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity”, in Law and Disagreement, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999) 164. 
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who reject normative scepticism admit the possibility of a universal level of overlap, such 
thinkers generally agree that post-metaphysical normative thought is anchored in a diffuse socio-
historical normativity. Non-foundationalism thus brings with it a variable degree of pluralism, 
which substitutes itself, either to monism or, at least, a thoroughgoing form of monism. The false 
belief that the end of metaphysical realism had to carry with it that of all normative universalism 
conceals a false equation between universalism, monism, and reason. This misapprehension is 
obviously in no small part due to Isaiah Berlin who, as Waldron points out,  
 
managed to convince a lot of smart people that because there are genuine trade-
offs to be made among a plurality of values and because there is no guarantee 
that the various values we treasure fit neatly into a single rational, preordained 
scheme, we should therefore eschew the idea of reason when it comes to 
figuring how the tangled priorities of our values play out in difficult individual 
cases.35  
 
Berlin even “made us all think that anyone who said the contrary was some sort of totalitarian. … 
But we don’t need to abandon the idea that these are issues of reason just because the reasoning 
of one person doesn’t yield the same results as the reasoning of another.”36 As Dworkin explains, 
uncertainty does not equal (internal) skepticism.37 While universalism is an issue for law as it is 
for other normative realms, Mahlmann is right to suggest that it does not call into question “the 
variety of interpretations of shared legal concepts or the importance of context for the 
understanding of legal precepts. … The interesting question is … whether all these conceptions 
are of equal normative plausibility.” 38  Waldron, for his part, chooses not use the word 
“universalism,” arguing that “it is an objective truth notion, and it says that the truth is the same 
everywhere, whatever people happen to believe.”39 But this is merely a matter of connotation. 
The non-foundationalist universal, with its social-historical rather than dogmatic anchoring, has 
absolutely no need to become metaphysically realist or “monist” at every level ― it only needs to 
accept a reasonable pluralism of implementations. This is why, for my part, I will speak of 
universalism.  
 
In his last, posthumous, book, Religion without God, Dworkin, being of the view that the “thing 
in itself” is no more necessary to the natural sciences than moral realism to the normative usage 
of reason, argues that “we accept our most basic scientific and mathematical capacities finally as 
a matter of faith.”40 What he calls the religious attitude entails doing the same with normative 
competencies. To be sure, “we disagree markedly about goodness, right, beauty, and justice” and 
                                                
35 Waldron, Laws Common, supra note 10, at 220. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Dworkin, Hedgehogs, supra note 33, chap 5. 
38 Mahlmann, supra note 26, at 373-374.  
39 See Waldron, Laws Common, supra note 10, at 117. 
40 Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God, (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2013) at 17 
[Dworkin, Religion]. 
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“have no agreed standards for moral or other forms of reasoning about value,” as we do for 
“scientific argument and valid mathematical demonstration.”41 The realm of values consists, 
formally as well as substantively, of “essentially contested concepts,” to borrow Walter Gallie’s 
term.42 Yet this difference, says Dworkin, is not determinative, since “interpersonal agreement is 
not an external certification in any domain.”43 (One might add, along with Michael Moore, that 
neither is the absence of agreement proof of the inexistence of an external reality.44) A second, 
and more significant, difference is that, in the realm of values “faith means something more, 
because our convictions about value are emotional commitments as well and, whatever tests of 
coherence and internal support they survive, they must feel right in an emotional way as well.”45 
This argument follows not only Nussbaum, but also a long tradition of thought, going back to 
Aristotle.46 
 
A complete and coherent reconstruction of all our scattered ethical, moral, political, and legal 
convictions resulting from multiple back-and-forths: one recognizes, in the faith which not only 
Dworkin but a whole constellation of thinkers had in the normative competencies of a human 
person, a faith in the method, generally attributed to John Rawls, of reflective equilibrium.47 
Although Rawls’s method was not, at the time, as unprecedented as it is often supposed,48 the 
quality of its articulation and the impact it had mean that it was a turning point in the history of 
normative thought. This method is meant to respect the scientific knowledge about human beings 
and society, without however conflating the possible and the desirable. It seeks at the same time 
to anchor itself in, and to prove itself through, our second order normative intuitions regarding 
institutions.49 If not clearly in his 1971 book,50 then certainly no later than 1975,51 Rawls took 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 WB Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts”, (1955-1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167. 
43 Dworkin, Religion, supra note 40, at 17. 
44 M. MOORE, « Moral Reality », Wisconsin Law Review, vol. 1982, no 6, p. 1061-1156, aux pages 1089-1090. 
45 Dworkin, Religion, supra note 40, at 19. 
46 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
47 See Rawls, Theory, supra note 2, at 42-44. 
48 It may even be possible to see a precedent for it in Hegel’s Jena-period writings. 
49 Rawls, Theory, supra note 2, at 8 (stating: “I shall proceed by discussing principles which do apply to what is 
certainly a part of the basic structure as intuitively understood”), 159 (“The reasoning is informal and not a proof, 
and there is an appeal to intuition as the basis of the theory of justice”). 
50 See ibid, § 9, “Some Remarks about Moral Theory”, at 44 (arguing that “[i]n any case, it is obviously impossible 
to develop a substantive theory of justice founded solely on truths of logic and definition”); § 20, “The Nature of the 
Argument for Conceptions of Justice”, at 102-103 (stating that “[i]n order to do this [i.e. show[] … that the two 
principles of justice are the solution for the problem of choice presented by the original position.], one must establish 
that, given the circumstances of the parties, and their knowledge, beliefs, and interests, an agreement on these 
principles is the best way for each person to secure his ends in view of the alternatives available”). A Theory of 
Justice contains multiple statements to the effect that its contractarian argument pre-supposes a conception of a 
democratic society as a fair system of co-operation among persons considerede as free and equal, and endowed with 
the twin moral faculties of having a sense of justice and a conception of the good. 
51 John Rawls, “Fairness to Goodness”, (1975) 84 Philosophical Rev 536 at 546 (arguing that “the original position 
does not presuppose the doctrine of abstract individualism. This is defined as the doctrine that the fundamental aims 
and interests of individuals are determined independently from particular social forms; society and the state are 
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these intuitions to be socially conditioned. As Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit well 
understood, “what is (and has always been) at issue for Rawls is ‘background justice’ in already 
existing societies.”52 Rawls was thus somehow concerned with “sociological moralism” or 
“ethical sociologism,” some of his most fundamental claims being perpahs similar to that, 
defended by Axel Honneth, of a “moral integration of society” or a “normative social 
infrastructure.”53  Rawls, however, stressed that there exist deep disagreements between the 
various articulated conceptions of justice integrated into the comprehensive doctrines. 
“Politically” detached from such doctrines by means of “the public reason,” these conceptions of 
justice take their place on a horizon of a common background confusedly composed not only of 
values and intuitions, but also of “considered,” albeit scattered and preanalytic, “judgments.” For 
example, the strong plurality of the conceptions of justice within liberal societies does not prevent 
their members from being virtually unanimous in considering slavery or corruption to be 
injustices. 
 
Yet if all societies, or at least those of a certain type, to which liberal democracies belong, 
possess a normative infrastructure whose interpretation is contested, is it surprising that in 
matters of Justice ― that is to say “basic rights and duties” and “division of advantages” 54 or, in 
other words, “what we owe to each other”55 ― people have turned to law, more intently than 
Rawls had done, in order to observe its most concrete manifestations? Is it surprising that people 
looked to constitutional law and justice for the most effective examples of the reflective 
equilibrium method? In other words, is it surprising that theories, such as the Dworkinian “law as 
integrity”56 and “moral reading of the constitution”57 recognize a certain assimilation of theory, 
philosophy, and practice of law ― and in particular of constitutional law ― as the method which 
Rawls had elaborated in order to put forward the contents of a public agreement on principles of 
justice, and which Dworkin renamed “interpretive equilibrium”?58 Dworkin speaks of “an 
                                                                                                                                                        
regarded as institutional arrangements that answer to these antecedent individual ends and purposes, as specified by a 
fixed and invariant human psychology. In contrast to this view, the theory of a well-ordered society stresses that the 
interests and ends of individuals depend upon existing institutions and the principles of justice they satisfy.”) Rawls 
then refers to § 79 of A Theory of Justice. His ethical sociologism, and in particular the grounding of his normative 
standpoint in a specific sort of society if not above all in the American society becomes more explicit beginning with 
the John Dewey Lectures of 1980 : « Le constructivisme kantien dans la théorie morale » (1980), trad. C. Audard, in 
Justice et démocratie, trad. C. Audard, P. de Lara, F. Piron et A. Tchoudnowsky, Seuil, 1993, p. 73-152. 
52 Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics, (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1990) at 123. 
53 See especially St-Hilaire, Lutte, supra note 13, at 335-94; Maxime St-Hilaire, “Autour d’un paradigme juridique 
de la reconnaissance / Recognition as a Legal Paradigm?”, in Maxime St-Hilaire, ed, “Axel Honneth et le droit”, 
(2011) 78 Droit et société. Revue internationale de théorie du droit et de sociologie juridique 261. 
54 Rawls, Theory, supra note 2, at 113. 
55 TM Scanlon, What we owe to each other, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998). 
56 Dworkin, Empire, supra note 33. 
57 Ronald Dworkin, “The Moral Reading of the Constitution”, New York Review of Books, March 21, 1996 
[Dworkin, “Moral Reading”]; Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
58 See Ronald Dworkin, “Rawls and the Law”, in Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2006) 241-261 [Dworkin, Robes]. See also Dworkin, Hedgehogs, supra note 33, at 63-66. 
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accurate public conception of individual rights”59 and, in his second-to-last book and magnum 
opus, Justice for Hedgehogs, ends up presenting law as “a branch of morality.”60 More precisely, 
law itself ― and not the theory of law alone61 ― conceived as a specialized normative practice, 
belongs in his view to the realm of political morality, which is a branch of morality, which in turn 
is a branch of ethics, a vast component of the independent domain of value, to which his great 
work is devoted. Following Rawls, but more robustly, Dworkin, for whom the normative 
infrastructure or background justice consists of interpretive principles, 62  recognizes the 
contribution of judicial review of legislation, and even that of law generally, to the development 
of a public conception of justice and to its implementation.63 He even thinks that in the “original 
position,” the partners would opt for his “interpretivist” conception of law, to which I will 
return.64 And while, for Rawls, a judge had in difficult cases to resort to “public reason,” 
Dworkin rejects the restrictions that this concept imposes on the admissibility of arguments in the 
realms of politics and law.65 Finally, by becoming, in Dworkin’s work, “interpretivism,” the 
somewhat modified method of reflective equilibrium is, mutatis mutandis, extended, well beyond 
the area of application which Rawls attributed to it, to all the components of the independent 
domain of value, such as literature and art, as well as law, politics, morality, and ethics.66 Though 
“Rawls seemed himself, at least on some occasions, to have accepted a fully sceptical view”67 
through a “constructivism” that may reads as straight political sociology, he “plainly had in mind, 
however, not a sociological but an interpretive search for overlapping consensus.”68  
 
                                                
59 Ronald Dworkin, “Political Judges and the Rule of Law”, in Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). 9 at 11-12 [Dworkin, “Political Judges”]. 
60 Dworkin, Hedgehogs, supra note 33, at 5. 
61 See Jeremy Waldron, “Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs”, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 13-
45, July 5, 2013, online <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290309>. 
62 Dworkin, Hedgehogs, supra note 33, at 51 (“Interpretive concepts … that we share in spite of disagreeing about 
which understanding of the concept is the best”); see also ibid, ch 8. 
63 Dworkin, “Rawls and the Law”, supra note 58, at 254-259. 
64 Ibid at 251 (arguing that “[t]hey might well think that they safeguard themselves better against arbitrairiness or 
discrimination if they do not instruct judges to do justice as they see it, but seek to discipline judges by insisting that 
they do their best to respect principled consistency as they see it.”) However, in reality, Dworkin has stated that in 
looking for a reflective equilibrium, he did not find the specific thougt experiment of a Rawlsian original position 
fruitful. Building on game theory, he has, for his part, argued that the equality of rights is contingent on a minimum 
level of economic and social equality, which the Rawlsian simulation pre-supposes. As a result, it is by no means 
clear that a different conception would yield the same choice of an equality of rights over that of material welfare, or 
indeed that the gamble of inequality would not be attempted. On this point, see Ronald Dworkin, “The Original 
Position” in Norman Daniels (ed), Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ Theory of Justice, (Standford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1989). 
65 Dworkin, “Rawls and the Law”, supra note 58, at 254. 
66 See Arthur Ripstein, “Introduction: Anti-Archimedeanism” in Arthur Ripstein (ed), Ronald Dworkin (Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 1 at 8 (arguing that “Dworkin broadens the idea of reflective 
equilibrium to a more general account of interpretation, which is concerned with explaining how our judgements 
about various domains of value can be correct”) [Ripstein, “Introduction”]. See also Dworkin, Hedgehogs, supra 
note 33, Part Two. 
67 Dworkin, Hedgehogs, supra note 33, at 65. 
68 Ibid, at 66. 
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Dworkin is too frequently taken to be a natural lawyer. Notwithstanding his use of the word 
“morality” and his debate with H.L.A. Hart and the Hartians,69 his theory is neither a form of 
natural law nor one of philosophy as a formal source of law.70 Although he described himself as 
“anti-positivist,” acknowledged the role of “moral judgment” in a jurist’s work and, in that 
context admitted all sorts of arguments, he should be regarded as a thinker of second order legal 
positivity and of the normative (or “moral”) significance of the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law, 
however, must then, with Waldron’s significant assistance, be given back its universal character 
― although Waldron himself prefers to speak of “consensus.” 
 
1.3 Second Order Legal Positivity 
 
To begin with, the “moral” principles enlisted by the Dworkinian conception of law are in no way 
absolutes. They have nothing to do with philosophical realism, but rather take root in a 
background justice incorporated in our social practices in the areas surrounding the idea of value. 
Dworkin is resolute in his non-foundationalism, his “anti-archimedeanism.” 71 As he 
acknowledges, this resolve is an adhesion or an inheritance, rather than a real contribution of his 
own.72 His conception of law thus seeks no support outside of the ordinary experience, which he 
calls “social practice” and examines from an internal point of view. Insofar as this practice is 
animated by an idea of value, to whose independent realm it belongs, he regards it as the locus, 
not of an agreement, but of interpretive debates. Besides shared convictions and considered 
judgments, a social practice in these areas includes specific modes of reasoning and of debating 
about principles and their implementation. And while, despite deep disagreements, not all 
interpretations are equally valid, it remains the case that the correctness of a given interpretation 
cannot be assessed otherwise than from an ordinary viewpoint, internal to the social practice in 
which it participates. According to Dworkin, the “moral principles of the law” thus belong to the 
realm of interpretation, which itself is located within a social practice. Since the practice in 
question is law, I will now consider how these “moral” principles are better understood as legal 
principles.  
 
To be sure, Dworkin believes that the very limits of the various axiological social practices can 
be the subject of debate.73 Following Rawls, and in keeping with a traditional representation, he 
also locates law as a social practice within a larger framework, which he calls “political 
community.” Law is thus situated downstream from the principles of this community, principles 
which he designates as “political morality.” More precisely, it is within a “community of 
principle” ― a model that he distinguishes both from a de facto community and a “rulebook 
                                                
69 Scott J Shapiro, “The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed”, in Ripstein, Ronald Dworkin, 
ibid, 22. 
70 Ronald Dworkin, “‘Natural’ Law Revisited”, (1982) 34 U Florida L Rev 165-188. 
71 “Give me a place to stand on, and I will move the Earth,” Arichemedes reputedly said. 
72 See Ronald Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It” (1996) 25:2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
87 at 139. 
73 See Ripstein, “Introduction”, supra note 66, at 13. 
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community” ― that there exists, in Dworkin’s view, a moral duty (albeit not an inconditional 
one) to obey the law. This duty flows not from a consensual acceptance of legal rules but from 
the fact of belonging to a common endeavour of a fair sharing of benefits and responsibilities, 
structured by a generalized adherence to the (meta)principle of “integrity,” to which I will return 
below.74 In this way, the Dworkinian conception of law seems to enlist political-moral principles 
― not absolute principles, to be sure, but nonetheless principles external to law. Yet Waldron is 
right to go beyond this superficial impression: 
It was very important for Dworkin that the invocation of principles in a case like 
[Riggs v. Palmer] should not be construed as a judge’s reaching beyond the law for 
something purely moral. [...] Dworkin’s position is that the discernment of a principle 
in a given body of law is not possible without the exercise of moral judgment. That 
does not mean the principle in question is nonlegal, that is, purely moral.75 
We must thus be wary of accepting at face value Dworkin’s claim that principles are a moral 
component of the law. Besides, the issue of their extra-legal character is not quite straightforward 
now that Dworkin regards law as a branch of morality.76 The target which Dworkin’s legal 
philosophy attacked was precisely the “discretion” which Hartian positivists ― Dworkin seems 
not to have been well acquainted with Hans Kelsen’s work and the tradition within which it was 
situated ― granted to judges in “hard cases” or, more generally, due to the “open texture” of the 
law.77 What most bothered Dworkin was the claim ― meant to be descriptive but which, in 
Dworkin’s view, based in interpretive social practice, had to be at least partly normative ― that 
judges created law in a manner akin to that of a legislature. Seeing in this claim an injustice and a 
threat to the valuable practice of judicial review of legislation, he meant, at the same time, to 
respond to the Holmes Lectures which Judge Learned Hand, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, had given the year after Dworkin served as his law clerk.78  
 
Dworkin himself summarizes his interpretivist conception of law as follows: “judges should 
enforce rules laid down by the legislature ..., but when confronted by a so-called gap, should not 
attempt to legislate as the legislator would, but should instead try to identify the principles of 
fairness or justice that best justify the law of the community as a whole and apply those principles 
to the new case.”79 The right interpretation of the law applicable to a given case is that which is 
founded on a principled reconstruction which, at the level both of coherence and of our moral 
convictions, best justifies, as a whole, the system of positive law, which Dworkin calls “legal 
structure.” In other words, this interpretation is that which achieves an exact “interpretive 
equilibrium between the legal structure as a whole and the general principles that are best 
                                                
74 See Dwrokin, Empire, supra note 33, at 202-224. 
75 Waldron, Laws Common , supra note 10, at 64. 
76 See notes 60-61, above, and accompanying text. 
77 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 124-136. 
78 See Ripstein, “Introduction”, supra note 66 at 4. 
79 Dworkin, “Rawls and the Law”, supra note 58, at 247-48. 
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understood as justifying that structure.”80 The true key to understanding Dworkin’s contribution 
to legal thought, the intervention of the principles not only in the judge’s, but also the lawyer’s 
and the scholar’s work, is the heart of his interpretivist (and thus at once descriptive and 
normative) model of the law as “integrity,” which is nothing other than “the promise that law will 
be chosen, changed, developed, and interpreted in an overall principled way.”81 The principles of 
Dworkin’s model are derived from an interpretation of the “morality” of a “political community” 
― but interpretation by a judge or a jurist, and aiming at best justifying the system of positive 
law and ensuring its completeness. These principles thus present themselves as the meeting point 
between substantive political or moral justice and formal legal justice. It is a common mistake, 
however, to overemphasize the first of these two dimensions. 
 
“Law as integrity” in fact mainly amounts to a broadening of the coherence requirement inherent 
in the equality principle which, in turn, structures the whole idea of law. Before speaking of the 
law’s “integrity,” Dworkin spoke of its “fairness” ― more specifically, the “fairness of treating 
like cases alike,” that is to say of formal justice.82 “Integrity” refers above of all to “the quality of 
being honest and having strong moral principles,” and, secondarily, to “the state of being whole 
and not divided.”83 Taking into account these two meanings, the move from “fairness” to 
“integrity” is suggestive: as it includes strong moral principles, the law is whole and complete. 
 
Although, in the same way as a constitution ― and notably that of the United States ― can do 
explicitly, they refer to the background justice of a political community, these principles are 
essentially legal. With greater or lesser strength in different legal orders, one can object that, 
contrary to what Dworkin says, the substantive source of the principles is not the “morality” of a 
“political community,” but legal doctrine. Yet it is always illusory to deny the fact that non-
superficial and socially conditioned normative intuitions impact the work of the constitutional 
judge or lawyer. The essential legality of the Dworkinian principles resides elsewhere. The 
justification they supply is not only substantive. It is also, if not primarily, formal. Their 
interpretive reconstruction must, notably, make it possible to articulate coherently the all of the 
legislators’, judges’, and jurists’ considered judgments, the entirety of the legal structure, the 
whole of the system of positive law.  
 
Simply put, the Dworkinian conception of law takes a expansive view of the science of law, by 
broadening its understanding of that science’s axiomatic coherence requirement. The 
interpretivist conception of law as integrity is ultimately that of legal science as a search for 
“coherence, not simply with particular doctrines here and there, but, as best as it can be achieved, 
                                                
80 Ibid, at 251. 
81 Dwrokin, Empire, supra note 33, at 214. 
82 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases”, in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1977) 81 at 113 [Dworkin, Rights]. 
83 “Integrity”, in Oxford English Dictionary .  
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principled coherence with the whole structure of law.”84 This is the point of the chain novel 
metaphor,85 as well as the allegory of judge Hercules.86 Thus the Dworkinian jurist “tries to 
impose order over doctrine,” (the best order possible, and thus the right one), “not to discover 
order in the forces that created it.”87 Much more than (extralegal or, so to say, pure) concepts of 
“liberty, equality, or democracy,” that of “[l]egality is sensitive in its applications … to the 
history and standing practices of the community … because a community displays legality, 
among other requirements, by keeping faith in certain ways with the past.”88 The law develops 
this supple culture of heritage, this flexible form of fidelity to the past by means of principles 
ascertained by jurists by implementing the legal metaprinciple of integrity.89 
 
Dworkin was not the first to model the ascertainment of principles, which is a well-established 
practice of the science of law, and especially constitutional law.90 Indeed he has himself 
suggested that his model in no way departs from the traditional method of the common law.91 
Within the continental European tradition, Adhémar Esmein had said, well before Dworkin, that 
as a branch of legal science, constitutional law “takes a state and a government that have reached 
a specific form, determined by custom or legislation, … ascertains their spirit and fundamental 
principles, as well as the consequences of that spirit and principles, [and] thus constructs their 
logical and legal system.92 Principles such as “substantive due process of law” in U.S. law, the 
so-called “unwritten” constitutional principles in Canadian law, the “fundamental un-codified 
rights” and the “limits inherent in rights” in German law, the protection of some laws or 
provisions against “implied repeal” in U.K. law, the “constitutional implications” in Australian 
law, and perhaps even the “fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the republic in 
French law are so many examples of this second-order legal positivity.  
 
Dworkin can indeed be criticized for having, against the run of his own interpretivism, “over-
positivized” “moral principles” by insisting that constitutional provisions relative to fundamental 
                                                
84 Dworkin, “Rawls and the Law”, supra note 58 at 250. 
85 See Dworkin, Empire, supra note 33 at 228-232. 
86 Ibid, chap 7 to 10; Dworkin, “Hard Cases”, supra note 82. 
87 Dworkin, Empire, ibid, at 273. 
88 Ronald Dworkin, “Hart’s Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy”, in Dworkin, Robes, supra note 58, at 
183. 
89 See also Waldron, “Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs”, supra note 61, at 25. 
90 In pre-Dworkinian American literature, see especially Roscoe Pound, “The Theory of Judicial Decision”, (1923) 
36:6 Harv L Rev 641, 36:7 Harv L Rev 802, and 36:8 Harv L Rev 940.; Roscoe Pound, “The Ideal Element in 
American Judicial Decision”, (1931) 45:1 Harv L Rev 136; Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law”, (1959) 73:1 Harv L Rev 1; Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1960). But the intellectual genealogy of the Dworkinian conception of law has been traced to 
the “first generation of English lawyers”: Mark D Walters, “Legal Humanism and Law-as-Integrity”, (2008) 67:2 
Cambridge LJ 352. 
91 See Dworkin, Empire, supra note 33, at 276-312. 
92 Adhémar Esmein, Éléments de droit constitutionnel, (L. Larose, 1896) at 21. 
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rights referred to them.93 He exaggerated the role of principles by suggesting that it is of them, 
rather than of positive norms, that the law consists.94 He also deliberately blurred, if not ignored 
altogether, the distinction between substantive and formal sources of law ― even though this 
distinction belongs to the ordinary experience of legal practice, the “social practice” which unites 
and characterizes jurists.  
 
That said, in order to understand Dworkin’s contribution clearly, we would do well not to 
overstate his self-declared anti-positivism. Dworkin offers neither merely another natural law 
critique nor yet a theory of moral philosophy as formal source of law, even though he does take 
the position that in appropriate cases, a judge is entitled to seek the lights of a philosopher’s 
work.95 Rather, Dworkin’s contribution ought to be understood as taking into account, thanks to 
an understanding of law as a specialized normative practice (as a normative science) rather than 
an object,96 something that in my opinion should be seen as a more abstract, more diffuse, and 
less “pure” level of legal positivity. But Dworkin’s mistake was in failing to distinguish, in 
amalgamating the different levels of legal positivity.97 This is what made him lose the debate 
with the positivists on the issue of the system of formal sources of law.98 I believe, therefore, that 
an attempt, such as that made by Wil Waluchow, to subject the principles of “constitutional 
morality” to the Hartian rule of recognition is doomed to failure.99 
 
While Dworkin rejects the theory of sources of law and amalgamates their different levels of 
positivity, for my part, I would suggest doing the exact opposite. We need to be able to 
distinguish the two levels of legal positivity, by maintaining, in accordance with the jurists’ 
ordinary experience, the distinction between formal and substantive sources of law. The formal 
sources are legislation, ordinary or constitutional, and judicial decisions.100 Nor may the source 
                                                
93 See Dworkin, “Moral Reading”, supra note 57, at 5 (arguing that “[a]ccording to the moral reading, these clauses 
must be understood in the way their language most naturally suggests: they refer to abstract moral principles and 
incorporate these by reference, as limits on government’s power”). 
94 Ronald Dworkin, “The Model of Rules I” [Dworkin, “Model”], in Dworkin, Rights, supra note 82, 14. 
95 See Dworkin, “Rawls and the Law”, supra note 58 at 254. 
96 See especially Jeremy Waldron, “Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?”, in Scott Hershovitz (ed), Exploring 
Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press) 155 at 161 
(Arguing that “there are … two ways of characterizing Dworkin’s approach: (i) his earlier characterization in terms 
of norms called principles, i.e. norms that were comprised in the law just like rules – only in the background of the 
law rather than in the foreground; and (ii) his later approach which talked of rival theories put forward by those who 
were working with the existing law to justify a current decision”). 
97 See, to the same effect, also ibid at 159 (claiming that Dworkinian law as integrity’s “disadvantage is the way it 
assimilates principles and policies to more discrete forms of legal provision, such as statutory rules, as though the 
identification, individuation, and citation of the former were in the end not much different from the identification, 
individuation, and citation of the latter”). See also Joseph Raz, “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” (1972) 81:5 
Yale LJ 823 at 843 
98 See Shapiro, supra note 69, at 49-50. 
99 Wilfrid Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree, (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 224 et seq. 
100 See Maxime St-Hilaire and Laurence Bich-Carrière, “La constitution juridique et politique du Canada: notions, 
sources et principes”, in Stéphane Beaulac and Jean-François Gaudrault-Desbiens (eds), Droit constitutionnel, 
JurisClasseur Québec, looseleaf ed. (Montréal: LexisNexis Canada, 2011). 
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be confused with its product. A principle can be the product of a formal source of law if it is 
codified in a constitutional text or established by case law. Otherwise, it can only be, as a matter 
of law, the product of a substantive source.  
 
This makes it possible not to confuse a scholar and a judge, or a constitutional principle set out in 
an academic work and one recognized by the decisions of a constitutional court. Similarly, 
Matthias Jestaedt, for example, contrasts the concept of a legal “dual constitution”, positive and 
meta-positive, to the integrationist eclecticism of German constitutional Dogmatik. It is not 
surprising that these critiques are equivalent, since in both cases, the issue concerns “fundamental 
questions regarding the relationship between legal science and positive law, [in other words] 
problems which must be considered in every legal culture.”101 Dworkin, like Rawls, enlists all 
interpreted principles of background justice of a specific community, focusing on his own, the 
United States. This leads to the question of whether it is possible to move from national legal 
constitutional principles to global principles of constitutional law. 
 
1.4 From National Legal Principles to ius gentium 
 
In his famous 1986 book, Law’s Empire, Dworkin wrote that “[i]ntegrity holds within political 
communities, not among them, so any opinion we have about the scope of the requirement of 
coherence makes assumptions about the size and character of these communities.”102 Almost two 
decades earlier, in an essay originally been published in the University of Chicago Law Review 
in 1967, “The Model of Rules I,” he took the 1889 case of Riggs v. Palmer as the main 
foundation of his critique of legal positivism and his alternative principle-based conception fo the 
law.103 However, “Dworkin didn’t address the transnational character of the principle appealed to 
in Riggs, and discussion of integrity was developed much later.”104 This crucial observation 
belongs to Waldron. Let me quote him at greater length:  
I suspect that if they notice it at all, most participants in the debate about Dworkinian principles read 
the passage [in Riggs] concerning “universal law administered in all civilized countries” as a natural 
law idea, picking up on the side of Dworkinian principles that refers to their moral appeal rather than 
their positive grounding. But that is wrong. [...] So there is this aspect of universal law as well as the 
Dworkinian logic of principles in Riggs v. Palmer. My aim is to bring the two aspects together, taking 
seriously the possibility that deep background principles, legal principles, may be inferred not just 
from a single existing body of positive law in the way Dworkin argued, but also from multiple legal 
systems taken together. Indeed, principles whose presence may not be so apparent in one system may 
come more clearly into view when we look at a whole array of legal systems105. 
                                                
101 Matthias Jestaedt, “La double constitution. Une stratégie positiviste”, (2011) 6 Jus Politicum. Revue 
internationale de droit politique, online <http://www.juspoliticum.com/La-double-constitution-Une.html>. 
102 Dworkin, Empire, supra note 33, at 185-86. 
103 See Dworkin, “Model”, supra note 94. 
104 Waldron, Laws Common, supra note 10, at 136. 
105 Ibid, at 66-67. 
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As for what is to take up this intermediate space between the reality of positive law as a product 
of formal sources and the ideal realm of a philosophical natural law, Waldron prefers to speak not 
of “moral” prinicples specific to a political community, but of a ius gentium, in the sense of a set 
of principles specific to a legal-scientific community which by definition is global. From this 
follows another difference between Waldron and Dworkin, which might otherwise go unnoticed. 
In contrast to the Dworkinian national legal-political principles, the legal-scientific principles that 
Waldron epistemologizes are, in his view, the subject of a “consensus.” This consensus is a 
general agreement, albeit non-unanimous and of course fallible, which reason requires us to take 
into account.  
 
For while he agrees with Dworkin that, in natural as in moral sciences, interpersonal agreement is 
never a guarantee of truth, and that, conversely, the absence of agreement does not establish the 
absence of truth, Waldron has always accorded greater significance than Dworkin to the fact that, 
in the former realm, agreement is much more common than in the latter.106 Initially, Waldron had 
emphasized the fact that, while in the natural sciences there exist so to say more substantive 
modes of resolving disagreement, there is no equivalent that could structure one or several of the 
normative sciences. However, law supplied purely formal modes of resolving dsagreements. 
These were, in particular, the democratic procedures provided by electoral and parliamentary law.  
This is precisely why Waldron, contrary to Dworkin, took the position that the debate about 
metaphysical objectivity was clearly irrelevant to law alone, rather than to the entirety of the 
normative realm.107 This was also the crucial reason why Waldron opposed judicial review of the 
conformity of legislation to constitutional guarantees of rights and liberties, at least if it took the 
form of effective validity or applicability control (as opposed to a purely advisory procedure).108 
 
This initial stage was before Waldron discovered ius gentium.109 Later on, he still denied that his 
opposition as a matter of principle to what he calls strong judicial review ― an opposition which 
still wants to maintain ― is at all incompatible with his plea that American courts engaged in 
such review resort to foreign law as ius gentium.110 Yet this denial is unconvincing. A reader of 
his 2012 book on the subject will find improbable his claim that a scientific legislator is ideal, 
and that constitutional adjudication resorting to ius gentium is merely a lesser evil. But, however 
                                                
106 Voir J. WALDRON, supra notes 34 et 96. 
107 Voir J. WALDRON, supra note 34, p. 170-171.  
108 See Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review”, (2006) 115:6 Yale LJ 1346 [Waldron, 
“Core of the Case”]. See also Jeremy Waldron, “Judges as Moral Reasoners”, (2009) 7:1 Int’l J Const L 2. 
109 See Jeremy Waldron, “Foreign Law and the Modern ius gentium”, (2005) 119:1 Harv L Rev 129 [Waldron, 
“Foreign Law”]; Jeremy Waldron, “Laws Partly Common to All Mankind (three lectures)”, Storrs Lectures, Yale 
Law School, September 10-12, 2007, online, <http://www.law.yale.edu/news/5408.htm>; Waldron, Laws Common, 
supra note 10. The stages which I distinguish here are “logical” rather than strictly chronological. The distinction I 
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that may be, the important point here is that, contrary to Dworkin, Waldron acknowledges that 
agreement is significant. This is especially the case of scientific “consensus” which, although it 
by no means guarantees truth, nevertheless creates a presumption to that effect, and thus an 
obligation to take it into account.111 Waldron thus believes that, although a “right answer,” a “just 
solution” can in theory exist notwithstanding profound disagreement, it remains the case that 
scientific consensus is the only post-metaphysical, non-realist substitute to the normative 
universal, to which reason attaches a duty of non-ignorance. 
 
In his 2005 sketch, Waldron wrote that while “the law of nature posed itself explicitly as an ideal 
… [i]us gentium … afforded a more grounded focus of aspiration, looking not just to philosophic 
reason but what law had actually achieved in the world.”112 One of the arguments which he then 
intuited was thus of a historical character: “[n]atural law might have provided the very basic 
premises of a normative account, but ius gentium embodied a set of enduring intermediate 
principles that one might use as touchstones for real-world legal systems.”113 In his 2012 book, 
Waldron develops this historical argument, through which he distinguishes ius gentium, this 
“natural law” of the jurists, from the natural law of the philosophers.  
 
Originally a despised branch of the pretorian law, the law of foreigners, the ius gentium was 
ultimately regarded by Roman jurists as an imperfect positivation of the Greek philosophical 
ideal of natural law. Later, in the work of Gaius, and even more strongly that of Ulpian, the 
distinction between ius gentium and natural law becomes less clear, only to be re-clarified in the 
work of Aquinas, where one can see a gap between the perspective of a reality of the natural law 
induced from common positive law and that of a natural law from which positive law ought to be 
deduced. During the Renaissance, ius gentium is associated, more or less confusely, with positive 
law, rather than a philosophical natural law.114 Later on, notably with the treaties of Osnabrück 
and Münster of 1648, that is to say the Peace of Westphalia, the ius gentium gives way to 
international law, as part of a lasting movement towards the positivization of law. A no less 
lasting consequence was a division between the positive law of the jurists and the natural law of 
the philosophers, which was so strong that the legal tradition of natural law was obliterated. Yet 
in contrast with the natural law of the philosophers, 
[n]atural law jurisprudence never used to be a matter of individuals just inserting their own moral 
judgments into legal reasoning, any more than natural science was ever just a matter of idiosyncratic 
observations about energy or gravity. In both instances the goal was the accumulation of knowledge, 
not just the validation of individual intuitions. No one in the modern world would take seriously novel 
claims about energy or gravity that did not refer to the work of the scientific community at large. It is 
harder for us, however, to imagine something similar for our moral thinking about rights or justice, 
accustomed as we are to the privileges of the individual conscience. Yet this is exactly what ius 
gentium provided–the accumulated wisdom of the world on rights and justice. The knowledge is 
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accumulated not from the musings of philosophers in their attics but from the decisions of judges and 
lawmakers grappling with real problems. And it was accumulated not only in the crude sense of one 
thing adding to another, but also in the sense of overlap, duplication, mutual elaboration, and the 
checking and rechecking of results that are characteristic of true science. Ius gentium, conceived in this 
way, is no guarantor of truth: a consensus in either the law or the natural sciences can be wrong. In 
neither field, however, is there a sensible alternative to paying attention to the established body of 
findings to which others have contributed over the years.115 
 
Although one understands that Waldron intends to emphasize the differences between ius 
gentium and philsophy, it is somewhat misleading to describe the former as “a body of positive 
law.”116 To be sure, in the same way as Dworkinian principles ― whose logic is at work here117 
― do not cease being mainly legal merely because their ascertainment involves, among other 
things, moral judgment,118 ius gentium does not become a form of moral or political philosophy 
just because “[i]t may alloy itself with elements of natural law inquiry.”119 Nevertheless, 
Waldron’s ius gentium does not correspond either to a national system of positive law or to an 
international or regional positive public law.120 Nor does it coincide with the entirety of foreign 
legal systems, or with all of them and supranational law together. It is rather “a sort of overlap” 
between these systems of positive law.121 Yet this indirect overlap defines ius gentium only 
partially and at a diffuse substantive level.  
 
At a more formal level, ius gentium is meant to be distinct, separate, independent from these 
other systems whose legality, more positive, is of a different character than its own.122 Waldron 
says that ius gentium is a body of principles none of which “has the weight of a legal rule,” or 
force of law or, in short, the authority of a norm of positive law.123 As a body, ius gentium is not a 
mere collection, but a “system” of principles. As it “is not really an institutionalized system of 
law[, a]ny systematicity it has must be static, in Kelsen’s sense, that is, doctrinal or content-
based.”124 However, Waldron’s invocation of Kelsen’s distinction between static and dynamic 
systematicity of law is mistaken. Kelsen’s static systematicity of a legal system refers to the idea 
of a formal hierarchy between the categories of legal norms, not merely to the general idea of a 
systematicity of contents or, put differently, of coherent contents.125 Thus at a formal level, ius 
gentium differs from positive laws by its principle-based nature. It also differs from them at a 
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territorial level, by its diffused global reach. Substantively, however, it is closer to them, being 
situated at their more or less abstract intersection points. Waldron provides some examples of the 
principles of the ius gentium: no punishment without trial; an accused’s right to be heard by an 
impartial tribunal and to summon witnesses; a general possibility of an enforced execution of 
contractual obligations; harsher treatment of intentional faults; differential treatment of minor 
citizens and those who are of age; a general possibility to dispose of the things of which one is 
the owner.126 Ius gentium is thus mostly public law, and indeed mainly constitutional law, and 
only rarely private law.127 
 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the principles of the jus gentium are the product of 
a legal science, the work of a global legal community understood as a scientific community. They 
are the subject of a legal-scientific consensus, and Waldron conceives this “consensus and [this] 
community” not only as “accumulation of authorities” but as a vast and “dense” methodological 
“network.”128 Consequently, beyond substantive legal principles, “it is not so much empirical 
facts or moral insights or attractive reform proposals that jurists glean from other’s judgments or 
from a worldwide legal consensus [as] ways of analyzing difficult problems ― modes of 
specifically legal analysis which relate the elements of a problem to the basic reasons of justice 
and public welfare with which the law is concerned.”129 Conceiving it not only as contents, but 
also as method, Waldron speaks of ius gentium as of a “repository of wisdom in the world from 
which it makes sense for us to learn,”130 rather than a “repository of principles,” as others have 
described comparative law.131 
 
Thus if Waldron’s ius gentium is a “body of positive law,” it is so only as a matter of what I call 
second-order positivity. As Waldron himself specifies, his ius gentium “is not an enacted body of 
law, but it is law nonetheless.”132 In his 2005 sketch, he represented it as “a source of normative 
insight grounded in the positive law of various countries and relevant to the solution of legal 
problems.”133 In the more developed 2012 model, Waldron says that “[i]t is perhaps best 
understood as an additional common source of national law rather than as a distinct body of law 
in its own right,”134 even though he then goes on to suggest the contrary.135 The contradiction is 
resolved once we understand, still more precisely, that ius gentium is neither a formal source of 
law, nor an immediate product of such a source, but a substantive source of law ― a substantive 
global source of national as well as international law. As part of a second-order legality, it is 
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formally independent of the national, regional, and international systems of positive law, on 
which it is substantively dependent. Although Wadron rejects the expression, which he finds to 
be used ambiguously,136 as a global substantive source of law, his ius gentium can very well be 
described as a “persuasive authority,” at least in Patrick Glenn’s sense of an “authority which 
attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it.”137 This tends to confirm the fact that Waldron’s 
model of ius gentium has always been tied to a conception of law as reason rather than will.138 
This distinction seems, indeed, to track that which Glenn makes between law as a national 
construction, which is hostile to the idea of foreign law as a “persuasive authority,” and that of 
law as “alliance,” which is favourable to it. According to Glenn, “[t]he nationalization of law has 
made it vulnerable. Its sources become too close, too particular, too subjective. In seeking to bind 
it fails to persuade and resistance becomes easier to justify than adherence.”139  Besides, 
Waldron’s 2012 book opens with, as an epigraph, the same quotation from the Institutes with 
which Glenn concluded his 1987 article: « Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim 
suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum jure utuntur. » 
 
The book, which Waldron dedicates to Dworkin, answers the question of the possibility of a 
passage from national constitutional legal principles to global constitutional legal principles in 
the affirmative, and with a positivity gain due to taking accordingly into account the constitutive 
consensus of the science of constitutional law. Waldron deserves a great deal of credit for 
overcoming the approximative and trivial forms of appeals to international and comparative law. 
But great though it is, his contribution remains, nonetheless, of an epistemological character. 
Beyond a few examples, and a more general claim that the idea of equal human dignity is so to 
say implicit in modern law,140 Waldron’s work does not substantially present the system of global 
principles of constitutional law. Besides, although it conceives ius gentium not only as a contents 
but also as a method, its treatment of this subject remains evasive. In particular, it does not 
indicate how the science of constitutional law manages to move back and forth between often 




The non-foundationalism of the current conditions of thought restores the irreducible part of faith 
that is implicit in any use of reason, including of course that which discovers a justice of second-
order legal positivity. Yet while agreement, as it does not abolish belief, cannot be a guarantee of 
truth, Waldron is right that scientific consensus is the object of a rational obligation of 
consideration. This is why, notwithstanding Waldron’s (understandable) rejection of the term 
“universality,” we can now reinterpret Nussbaum’s claim that “universal ideas of the human do 
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arise within history and from human experience, and can ground themselves in experience.”141 
One of these ideas ― the logically first principled specific expression of the value of equality 
within the legal-scientific “consensus” or, in other words, the meta-principle of legal science ― 
is the Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat, État de droit. 
 
2.1 Rule of Law 
 
The phrase has, in particular, been consecrated by the English version of the 3rd recital of the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union of 2000, the preamble and the article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007, articles 2, 3, and 4 
of the Interamerican Democatic Charter of 2001, the preamble of Canada’s Constitution Act, 
1982, paragraph 1(c) of the South African Constitution of 1996, and paragraph 1(a) of the U.K.’s 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Initially formal if not formalistic, the principle of the Rule of 
Law, in its modern version, is inextricably linked to that of the fundamental rights of the human 
person. These rights become meaningful in light of the principle of human dignity which ― 
following Waldron, even though he does not favour the substantive conception of the Rule of 
Law ― must be thought of as a status, the highest status possible, but a universal status now, 
rather than one reserved, as it once was, to a caste, a class, or a rank.142 These two aspects ― one 
formal, the other substantive ― are linked to the institution of constitutional adjudication. 
 
The phrase is modern: “Rule of Law” dates back to the 15th century; “Rechtsstaat” to 1798; 
“État de droit” to 1868. The “discourse” is even more so.143 Yet at its highest level of generality, 
the idea which, as Lon Fuller summarized it, is that of “subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules,” is an old one.144 To keep it at once very short and very simple indeed, the 
idea of quasi-intangible laws that must bind legislators themselves may be as old as that which 
underpinned the “laws of Solon.”145 Plato defends the idea of a government subject to “law” in 
Laws, as does Aristotle in the third book of Politics. Later, from the Magna Carta of 1215,146 to 
Albert Venn Dicey’s famous 1885 book,147 the progressive assertion of a principle of the control 
of legality of all actions, even those of heads of governments, by ordinary courts allowed the 
British legal tradition to contribute greatly to the effectiveness of an old ideal. Even before this 
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evolution had been completed, the Rule of Law made nothing short of an evolutionary leap in the 
United States. From the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776,148 to the Federalist Papers of 
1787-1788,149 to Marbury v. Madison in 1803,150 or, even before that, through American legal 
culture as a whole, dating back to the colonial period,151 a new nation had offered the world a 
new model of the Rule of Law, corresponding no longer to a legal, but a constitutional state. To 
this day, the modern concept of the Rule of Law refers notably to the idea of a written 
constitution which positivizes the fundamental rights of the human person, and that of a judicial 
review of constitutionality which extends to legislation. It has now been proven that, especially 
since the 1990s, the influence of the constitution152 and the constitutional case law153 of the 
United States on the constitutional framers and judges of other nations is in a freefall, to the point 
that the improvement of the model is now led by more recent constitutional states, including 
Germany, South Africa and, according to a study by David Law and Mila Versteeg, Canada.154 
However, contrary to federalism and presidentialism, judicial review is an element of the 
American constitutionalism whose influence is still growing.  Their vast study thus gives Law 
and Versteeg the opportunity to note that “[i]t is perhaps ironic that the most popular innovation 
of American constitutionalism has been judicial review, given that this celebrated institution is 
nowhere mentioned in the U.S. Constitution itself.”155 In 1946, 25% of the world’s written 
constitutions provided for some form of judicial review. In 2006, it was 82%. Today it is close to 
90%.156 
 
The epistemological discussion of the first part of this article has borrowed much from Waldron. 
Yet he is still thought of as a fierce opponent of judicial review. In reality, he is only opposed to a 
very specific form of judicial review, which he calls the strong judicial review. It involves review 
(1) by courts, (2) on the basis of fundamental rights, of the constitutionality of (3) legislation; 
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specifically, of (4) the validity or applicability of legislation.157 In a recent text, Waldron 
distinguishes judicial review and judicial supremacy, acknowledging that even if strong, the 
former, which at its best may merely amount to a modest review power, does not involve the 
latter, which alone is what truly disturbs him now.158 He admits that not only his personal 
opposition to a form of judicial review is a minority viewpoint,159 but also that Mark Tushnet’s 
wish, a withdrawal of the constitutions from the custody of the judicial power, will not come 
true.160 Besides, in 2011, Waldron had taken the position that the Rule of Law neither excluded 
nor entailed judicial review, towards which it rather is “neutral.”161 There is also, as we have 
seen, a tension in Waldron’s work between a conception of law as a science or body of technical 
knowledge, and the claim that legislators, for example, could conduct a constitutional review of a 
legal nature. 
 
The universal ambit of the principle of human rights ― positivized by most written constitutions, 
of which the overwhelming majority provides for some form or other of judicial review ― is first 
of all suggested by the Universal Declaration of 1948. It is also suggested by the two 
international covenants of 1966, the one dealing with civil and political rights, and the other with 
economic, social, or cultural rights. So it is by the Final Act of Helsinki of August 1, 1975, which 
closed the Conference on the Security and Co-operation in Europe. Recall, by the way, that it was 
still the position of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Conference of 
1973-75 ― which in 1995 became the Organization for the Security and co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) ― that human rights were conceivable without democracy. Yet although multiparty 
democracy did not expressly appear in the work of this forum ― which aims at the adoption of 
non-legally binding instruments whose interpretive authority has nonetheless been demonstrated 
― until the Bonn conference of 1990 on economic co-operation in Europe, this position quickly 
proved unsustainable. Already the Final Act of 1975 officialized the recognition by the two 
superpowers of the day, by European states, and by Canada of the right of peoples to self-
determination. The Madrid meeting of 1980-83 saw the adoption of the objective of the 
promotion of the participation of persons in political life. In Vienna, in 1986-89, the member 
states agreed that political rights were among those of the highest importance, and the states 
which had not already done so undertook to adhere to the two international human rights 
covenants, one of which notably protects political rights. Beyond the economic discourse, the 
role of this legal dialectic in the collapse of the Soviet empire and model remains largely under-
appreciated. Finally, to come back to the general universality of human rights, let us recall that, 
on June 25, 1993, notwithstanding lively debates, the 171 nations taking part in the World 
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Conference on Human Rights agreed on the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
which notably stipulates, in its Article 5, that “[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated,” and that “[w]hile the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it 
is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and 
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” In 2006, even as he devoted a lengthy 
article to his opposition to strong judicial review, Waldron also took note of a “worldwide 
consensus on human rights,” as well as a “history of thinking about rights.”162 In his 2012 book 
on ius gentium, he made the following clarification, which also extends Nussbaum’s statement to 
the effect that the universal can very well rest on human experience: 
Neither modern human rights law nor national bills of rights came into existence by magic. Historians 
trace the two ideas to the activity of certain elites: philosophers and statesmen at end of the eighteenth 
century and a small group of influential statesmen and diplomats in the decades following the Second 
World War. Elites were certainly the immediate sponsors of these ideas. But there is a broader sense in 
which the emergence of individual rights guaranteed by law was the product of a popular movement 
among the rights bearers themselves. The people themselves–the peoples themselves–indicated that 
they were no longer willing to be ruled without these guarantees. It was not the rulers of the world, but 
the people of the world who insisted on this arrangement, though the rulers did respond affirmatively 
and more or less enthusiastically to their demands.163    
It is true that the idea of a European constitutional ius commune is reflected in European human 
rights law, as well as in EU law. The preamble of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the European Convention on Human Rights, or the ECHR) 
refers to a “a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law.” For its 
part, in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and Nold decisions, respectively in 1970 and 
1974, the Court of Justice of the European Communities spoke of “the constitutional traditions 
common to member states,” referring, in both cases, to fundamental rights. This notion of 
“constitutional traditions common to the Member States” was then included in article 6, 
paragraph 3 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. In 2007, the Lisbon treaty endowed the European 
Union with a Charter of Fundamental Rights. The idea of a European constitutional “law” or 
“heritage” is used by authors such as Peter Häberle164, Rainer Arnold,165 and Dominique 
Rousseau.166 Yet as Marie-Claire Ponthoreau points out “these common constitutional principles 
are not specifically European, being the heritage of a long legal and political tradition shared with 
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the Americans,” 167 who, I am tempted to remind the reader, have had their share of influence on 
the drafting of the Grundgesetz of 1949.168 
 
The Rule of Law, human rights, and democracy are often presented as the three great principles 
of the global constitutional heritage. However, a coherent reconstruction makes it possible to 
situate them as aspects of a modern democratic Rule of Law state founded on human rights. To 
begin with, modern representative democracy can be “derived” 169  from human rights (in 
particular the political rights and the civil liberties of thought, opinion and expression), which are 
protected by most written constitutions.170 These rights then add a substantive component171 to 
the formal concept of the Rule of Law,172 which, by expanding from a control of legality to that 
of constitutionality, in turn reinforces their own positivity. It is thus possible to speak, more 
concisely, of a modern conception of the Rule of Law.  
 
According to Brian Tamanaha, a written constitution, democratic elections, explicitly protected 
individual rights, the “separation of powers” ― though it would be preferable to speak of the 
narrower principle of judicial independence173 ― and judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation are now considered to be essential to liberalism and to the Rule of Law.174 Although it 
retains a formal dimension, this modern conception of the Rule of Law is sometimes described, 
by way of a pars pro toto syndecdoche, as the “substantive conception,”175 especially since it is 
true that it gives rights the pride of place. These rights become “fundamental” in that they limit 
the action of the state all the more for being now its foundation and investing it with an 
implementing mission. This is why Dworkin, who unreservedly adheres to this modern 
conception of the Rule of Law despite his apparent parochialism, is right to call it the “rights 
conception.”176  
 
For his part, Waldron, to whom I have largely been referring here, does not share this substantive 
conception of the Rule of Law.177 More even than a formal conception, he favours yet another, 
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procedural one.178 He thus wonders why the crucial role of procedural principles and standards is 
missing from the formalist theories of the Rule of Law, the procedural dimension of law being in 
his view irreducible to its formal dimension, with which it sometimes is even in tension. As he 
does not adhere to the substantive conception, Waldron does not seriously explore the possibility 
of reconstructing fundamental rights as procedural guarantees (not only judicial, but also 
administrative, legislative, and constitutional). It seems to me that, although it is most interesting, 
the procedural conception of the Rule of Law should not be situated on the same level as the 
opposition between the formal and substantive conceptions, which it rather seeks to transcend. 
That said, as part of the development of his work, Waldron, without ever renouncing his views, 
has been led increasingly to present his opposition to the substantive conception of the Rule of 
Law as a personal preference, rather than a necessary consequence of his theoretical claims.179 
 
The global principles of constitutional law can thus be reduced to a modern conception of the 
Rule of Law focused on fundamental rights. Thus goes the synthesis. At the level of analysis, 
T.R.S. Allan – who, incidentally, argues that judicial review can very well make do without a 
written constitution180 ― points out, quite rightly, that “[t]he rule of law is an amalgam of 
standards, expectations, and aspirations.”181 Indeed, it is necessary to address the question of 
what it is that distinguishes a standard from a principle, an indicator, or a simple horizon.  
 
2.2 From Principles to Standards 
 
According the Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Project, for example, the Rule of Law 
today comprises: “(1) Constraints on government powers; (2) absence of corruption; (3) open 
government; (4) fundamental rights; (5) order and security; (6) regulatory enforcement; (7) civil 
justice; (8) criminal justice; (9) informal justice.182 The organization publishes an annual report 
assessing the quality of the Rule of Law in a growing number of countries on the basis of these 
criteria. But these criteria, from which is derived, for example, that of access to justice, are not 
standards. Nor are what the Venice Commission considers to be the sujects of a consensus on the 
essential components of the Rule of Law: “(1) [l]egality … (2) [l]egal certainty; (3) [p]rohibition 
of arbitrariness; (4) [a]ccess to justice before independent and impartial courts, … (5) [r]espect 
for human rights; (6) [n]on-discrimination and equality before the law. ”183 Both of these are lists 
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of principles structuring the modern Rule of Law or of indicators which can be inferred from 
such principles. The same is true, for example, of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute’s “Guide for 
Politicians.”184 As for the World Bank’s Worldwide Gouvernance Indicators (WGI) , they, like 
other approaches that make the Rule of Law contingent on an economic conception of 
development, emphasize its formal dimension, especially the effectiveness requirement, which 
becomes a measure of “efficiency,” especially that of the protection of property rights, measured 
most often by the perceptions of the actors.185 David Restrepo Amariles concludes that the Rule 
of Law is not an end in itself on such views, but a mere means.186 A somewhat different way of 
seeing the World Bank’s indicators leads me to the conclusion that the Rule of Law does not 
appear there as a metaprinciple of ius gentium as science of constitutional law, but as something 
which the science of development economics borrowed from the science of law and more or less 
repurposed for its own ends. 
 
While the principle or the indicator, such as the indepedence of the judiciary or of the 
constitutional judges, can be merely the result of an analysis, of the application of a derivative 
legal logic187 to the product of the generally consensual interpretive reconstruction of the global 
practice of the Rule of Law, a standard is, for its part, more directly a practice itself or, as we 
shall see, a category of practices regarded as being among the best. The search for best practices 
can include a negative or eliminatory aspect, an ascertainment of the worst cases, of what Kim 
Scheppele describes as “aversive precedents.”188 Standards are different from principles or 
indicators by their greater degree of concreteness, of positivity, of precision. Speaking of the sub-
indicators of the World Bank’s Rule of Law indicator, Restrepo Amariles notes that “the sub-
indicators of the Rule of Law are too broad, and include too many agregated factors, which 
makes it difficult to identify the provisions or procedures that ought to be reformed.189 On the one 
hand, this is also generally true of the “factors” and the “sub-factors” of the indexes exclusively 
devoted to the Rule of Law. On the other, this is normal, as the function of principles, indicators, 
and factors is not the same as that of standards, which is complementary to theirs. To be sure, the 
standards are valued over and above other practices in accordance with principles and their 
                                                
184 Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law / The Hague Institute for the 
Internationalisation of Law, Rule of Law: A guide for politicians, 2012, online <http://rwi.lu.se/what-we-
do/academic-activities/pub/rule-of-law-a-guide-for-politicians/>. 
185 See, The World Bank Group, The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013, online: 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>; Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo 
Mastruzzi, « The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues », September 2010, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, online: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130> 
186 David Restrepo Amariles, “The mathematical turn: l’indicateur Rule of Law dans la politique de développement 
de la Banque Mondiale”, in Benoît Frydman and Arnaud Van Waeyenberge (eds), Gouverner par les standards : de 
Hume aux rankings, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2014) 193 at 193, 231. 
187 See note 169, above. 
188 Kim Lane Scheppele, “Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional 
Influence through Negative Models”, (2003) 1:2 Int’l J Const L 296. 
189 Restrepo Amariles, supra note 186, at 233. See also Kenneth E Davis, “What can the Rule of Law Variable tell us 
about the Rule of Law?”, (2004) 26:1 Mich J Int’l L 141. 
 31 
derivatives. Moreover, the distinction between an abstract principle or sub-principle and a 
concrete standard will not always be easy to draw in practice. Yet it remains the case that in order 
to ascertain a standard, it is certainly necessary to deploy a principled reconstruction, but in order 
to make an evaluative return to the practice, at a larger scale, that is to say, in greater detail than 
needed when formulating indicators or factors. Lastly, contrary to principles or indicators which 
only enable a relative consistency control, a standard must normally be capable of grounding an 
absolute conformity control.  
 
The requirement of “a transparent, accountable and democratic process for enacting law”190 is 
doubtless more of an indicator. That granting dual voting rights to national minorities “can only 
be justified if [1] it is impossible to reach the aim pursued through other less restrictive measures 
which do not infringe upon equal voting rights; [2] it has a transitional character; [and 3] it 
concerns only a small minority”191 is closer to a standard. The same can be said of the idea that, 
as “federal states in Europe and elsewhere in the world all have bicameral systems [because 
p]opular representation has to be accompanied by representation of the constituent geographical 
entities … this situation … has become a key rule of federalism.”192 Finally, to argue that the 
“[t]he permissible departure from the norm” of equality of the electoral weight of constituencies 
“should not be more than 10%, and should certainly not exceed 15% except in special 
circumstances” such as the need to “protect[] … a concentrated minority,” or to ensure the 
representation of a “sparsely populated administrative entity”193 is, assuredly, to invoke a 
standard. So is it to claim that, when it exists, “public financing [of political parties] must be 
aimed at each party represented in Parliament.”194 Lastly, numerous elements of the Venice 
Commission’s reports on judicial appointments are standards as well.195 Now, while the arsenal 
of principles which make up the modern conception of the Rule of Law takes the role of a value 
criterion in an effort of ascertainment of the best practices of constitutional law throughout the 
world, it is not alone in doing so. It is not all there is to the standard-setting method. 
 
2.3 Comparative Law, the Search for Functional Equivalents, and Typology 
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To value some effective practices of constitutional law above others that exist in the world, and 
so to make them into standards, already implies resorting to some extent to comparative 
constitutional law. That this is done in light of principles already suggests that positive 
international public law will not be the only point of comparison. For example, in 1999, Sujit 
Choudhry doubtless made a contribution to the debate by insisting on taking better account of the 
fact that the world’s supreme and constitutional courts often refer to “comparative sources” that 
“are not necessarily part of international law.”196 According to Ponthoreau, “questions of 
methodology have seldom been considered in comparative constitutional law,” as they have been 
by private law comparativists. 197 But the disagreement between comparativists, including on the 
topic of “methodology,” which is supposed to bring them together, is rather more general, and 
has indeed been described as an “identity crisis.” 198  We have seen that, as a matter of 
epistemology, the Waldronian ius gentium model went beyond vague invitations to resort more to 
international law as well as to comparative law, even as it remained embryonic at the level of 
methodology. But while ius gentium is irreducible to the sum of national, regional, and 
international systems of positive law, its scientifically consensual development nevertheless 
involves taking account of these systems, in which it is substantively anchored. It must thus be 
methodologically situated, if not among, then in relation to the main current approaches to 
comparative law. From this perspective, the ius gentium model seems to tend towards so-called 
normative or universalist approaches, which its development could no doubt reinvigorate. This 
notably means that it belongs methodologically to a category of functionalist approaches and that 
it disclaims the form of contextualism that presents itself as a categorical or otherwise strong 
objection to comparison. 
 
Legal scholarship is still weighed down by sterile and boring debates regarding the very 
possibility of legal comparison. This is a symptom of a generalized epistemological and, 
therefore, methodological malaise. Of course, comparativists must attempt to take stock of 
system, of culture, of language, and of the other components of “context.” Of course, they ought 
to be prudent in the matter of transplants,199 even while locating them within an inevitable 
process of acculturation. The law, as any science, is not without its difficulties. But there is 
nothing there that ought to be held up as an insuperable obstacle. And yet, under the more or less 
conscious influence of two apparently contradictory but really convergent lines of thought, 
namely empirical scientism and postmodernism, this is how legal contextualism sees the matter. 
All of its manifestations are located on a sort of continuum that ranges from a culturalism that 
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purports to belong to social or historical sciences on one extreme, to a neoexistentialism on the 
other, with a whole spectrum of identitarianisms in the middle. Waldron would like to believe 
that such ideas, which were briefly successful during the Romantic age due, for example, to 
Herder and Savigny work, belong to the past of legal science.200 And yet, a contextualism that 
asserts the impossibility of a normatively fruitful comparison and of the discovery of equivalents 
can be found, to give but a few examples, in the work of a William Alford,201 a George 
Fletcher,202 or a Pierre Legrand, who even proclaims the absolute singularity of any legal system 
properly understood as a “culture.”203 
 
A somewhat more sophisticated form of contextualism is obviously influenced by the work of 
philosophers who are at once “communitarian” and “post-colonial,” such as Charles Taylor204 
and James Tully.205 It insists on an intercultural legal “dialogue,” a legal “interculturalism.” 206 
This culturalist form of contextualism can be seen, for example, in the work of Sarah Harding207 
and Sujit Choudhry.208 This approach aims at transcending the opposition between particularism 
and universalism ― but fails to do so. First, it is mistaken as to the nature of the current forms of 
universalism, by committing precisely the error which, relying on Nussbaum, I described above, 
and which consists in regarding it as a necessarily metaphysical foundationalism.209 Choudhry is 
quite simply wrong to assert that universalist approaches to comparative law are “premised on 
extremely strong normative claims,” and involve a legal science “that is openly normative in 
character,” in the sense that this science is purely philosophical and that the global principles and 
standards these claims rehabilitate are (philosophically) “transcendent.”210 He is no closer to truth 
when he asserts that “dialogical interpretation” is more legitimate than any universalism.211 
Secondly, postmetaphysical universalism involves overlapping principles, and admits of a 
reasonable diversity of implementations, so that, accepting a measure of particularity, universalist 
approaches to law have long renounced the project of a general uniformization of positive law, 
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and a fortiori of its unification. Any nation is governed by laws common to mankind only in part, 
as Gaius already said.212 In 1896, Esmein took note of the fact that the respective constitutional 
laws of the “West’s free nations” presented not only “family resemblances,” but also ineradicable 
“individual traits.”213 In 1976, without ever denying the ineradicability of a large sphere of 
cultural difference, Donald Kommers argued that “the study of comparative constitutional law 
can be a search for principles of justice and political obligation that transcend the culture bound 
opinions and conventions of a particular political community.”214 At present, universalism 
becomes, for example, “ordered pluralism” in the work of Mireille Delmas-Marty, who asserts 
that, between the monist unification and the radical relativist pluralism, it is enough, for the 
“systematization” of a comparative law by means of a search for “harmonization” or the 
“settlement” of legal systems, that “the norms be close enough to the reference principle in order 
to be regarded as compatible.”215 Even when this reference principle is, in fact, a standard, it still 
normally allows for a variety of ways to conform to it. The universalism on which the 
standardizing methodology is based makes it possible to avoid the Scylla of “excessive 
rationalization” and the Charybdis of the “radical cultural relativism.”216 Indeed, the living 
experience of the modern Rule of Law is largely a pluralist one.217 
 
It has been well said that “one should avoid de mystification of contexts.”218 Indeed, in their 
impressive empirical study, Law et Versteeg have concluded that the claim “that formal 
constitutions serve an expressive function as statements of national identity” was seriously 
undermined by the fact “that constitutions tend to contain relatively standardized packages of 
rights.”219 Other research, including that of Kai Möller, corroborates this finding.220 Yet even in 
its dialogical version, culturalist contextualism is worried by the internationalization of particular 
national constitutional cultures authorized by a universalist comparativism.221  As Waldron 
observes, “[n]o doubt there is a lot that is ethnocentric” in the work of scholars who, as for 
instance Vitoria, have projected, as best they could, on the indigenous societies of the Americas 
the legal categories and principles derived from the European context with which they were 
familiar. Yet, as Waldron suggests, we can value such scholarship ― not indeed in order “to 
congratulate our civilisation on its tolerance and humanity but to note that a self-referential 
starting point does not preclude the possibility of projection into an unfamiliar environment and 
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further learning and development.” 222  In other words, the internationalizing projection of 
particular legal culture can sometimes be a stage in the ascertainment of areas of overlap between 
quite different legal cultures. Better yet, we might say that, in law as elsewhere, a (variable) 
measure of initial culture-centrism is the price of entry into any intercultural dialogue. Besides, 
pace some philosophers, jurists, and politicians, cultural spaces are neither monolithic nor 
static.223 Complex processes, not necessarily of deculturation, but of acculturation involve not 
only the legal cultures of nations or communities, but also a global culture of human rights.224 
And to any objectifying attempt at freezing a legal culture the better to protect it, one must object 
that law is also the subject of dispute, which can modify it, whether to bring it closer to or to 
move it further away from a better implementation of equality, the most basic of legal 
principles.225 In the United States, for instance, the doctrinal and scholarly understanding of the 
principle of the 14th Amendment has evolved considerably, and with it the American 
constitutional and legal “culture.” 
 
To an approach that sees context as insuperable, we should prefer that, theorized notably by Ernst 
Rabel,226 Max Rheinstein,227 Otto Kahn-Freund,228 Konrad Zweigert, and Hein Kötz,229 which 
directs most brilliant contributions to comparative law ― functionalism, including in the realm of 
constitutional law.230 As the works of, in particular, Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, András 
Sajo and Susanne Baer231 show, once it has been, of course, situated in its context, the functional 
equivalent has a role to play in the comparison of constitutional and public laws.232 By creating 
types, the functional method of looking for equivalents makes the mass of national, regional, and 
international laws intelligible. As Guillaume Tusseau’s study of constitutional justice brilliantly 
demonstrates, typologization must, insofar as possible, operate a posteriori, after a real study of 
positive law, rather than a priori, taking the shape of what Tusseau calls great scholarly 
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“models.” The danger of the latter approach is to fall prey to the “legalist illusion” which, 
moreover, can mask a programme that is more political than legal.233 
 
Yet while Zweigert is right that the functional methodology of comparative law must be 
immediately followed by a “critical appreciation,”234 in reality, functionalist comparativism does 
not by itself provide the operating method of valuing certain types above others. At present, 
functionalist and universalist approaches tend to be opposed to each other as, respectively, 
descriptive and normative, even though, in order to complement each other, they ought to be 
interconnected. As Vicky Jackson points out, this opposition is given substantive explanations. 
The comparative constitutional law relative to government structure is said only to be amenable 
to descriptive study, while that relative to fundamental rights is supposed to lend itself more 
easily to normative inquiry.235 And “[y]et the search for ‘just principles’ of human rights law may 
be no more theoretical or universalist than the search for ‘good’ principles of government 
design.”236 Kommers, for instance, has long been demonstrating that a universalist approach to 
comparative constitutional law is also possible in the realm of federalism.237 Besides, the ius 
gentium relative to fundamental rights has already been having an effect on its structural 
counterpart ― witness the manner in which the principle of proportionality has been radiating on 
the global federative heritage relative to the settlement of division of powers disputes.238 
According to Jackson, the comparison of structural legal constitutions sometimes hides a 
normative inquiry behind what the use of functionalist “methods” or “techniques” would 
suggest.239 This is no doubt suggestive, but does not answer the question of how the functional 
method can be deployed by the universalist approach to the comparative law of fundamental 
constitutional rights. Nor does it exactly answer the question of how, that is to say by which 
specific “technique,” the functional method can serve a universalist approach of constitutional 
law, that of fundamental rights as well as of structure. The only indication that Jackson gives in 
this respect is that this technique differs from merely resorting to international law. My own 
answer is that this technique is precisely that of global standards. 
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2.4 From Typology to Valuing, and from Standards (back) to Principles 
 
Obviously, the issue of valuing one type of practices rather than another can only arise in the 
presence of a plurality of types. Hence it is possible to speak of the “Generic Bill of Rights,” 
modeled by Law and Versteeg on the basis of a “rights index” which they themselves developed 
from a database of 729 constitutions enacted and ratified by 188 states between 1946 à 2006,240 
as a standard. Most of the time, however, a comparative constitutionalist will be faced with a 
plurality of types, so that valuing one or some of them rather than the others will require a 
criterion, a benchmark. It will then be possible to refer to the general principles of the modern 
Rule of Law, and the indicators derived from them. However, before doing so, it will be 
necessary ― following an epistemology which, as we can easily see, favours the more positive 
sources and allows resorting to the less positive ones only so far as necessary ― to consult 
supranational, regional, or international law, and in particular that relative to human rights. As we 
have seen, by being made fundamental, human rights are at the heart of the modern Rule of Law 
state. It is indeed an integral part of the Venice Commission’s method, not systematically to 
follow, but to maintain a dialogue with the European Court of Human Rights. Its 2012 opinion on  
the Hungarian judicial system is illustrative, as it refers, in the matter of the distribution of cases 
among judges, to the case law relative to article 6 of the ECHR, which protects the right to a fair 
trial.241 
 
The combination of comparative constitutional law and the taking into account of international 
human rights law regularly contributes to valuing certain types rather than others, and thus to the 
ascertainment of standards. But these, in return, tend to enrich the interpretation of principles. 
The road which the science of constitutional law travels from principles to standards is a two-way 
one, so that moving from standards to principles is equally possible. A sort of reflective 
equilibrium, its interpretive equilibrium can only be maintained by means of incessant back-and-
forth movement. This is how we should understand Waldron’s claim that “[t]hough it is 
important to distinguish ius gentium … from international law properly so-called, … one of its 
most important manifestations is in international human rights law, particularly associated with a 
sort of overlap between the fundamental rights provisions of national constitutions and bills and 
charters or rights.” 242  Similarly, Kai Möller concludes that the “moral structure” of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by national systems of constitutional law is identical to that of the 
human rights guaranteed by international law.243 
                                                
240 Law and Versteeg, supra note 152, at 770-79. 
241 European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the 
Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts 
of Hungary, CDL-AD(2012)001 at paras 86-94, online: <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-
AD(2012)001.aspx>. 
242 Waldron, Laws Common, supra note 10, at 32. 
243 See Kai Moller, “From constitutional to human rights: On the moral structure of international human rights”, 
(2014) 3:3 Global Constitutionalism, 373. 
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Lastly, besides supranational law, the linkage between a functional spectrum of typical practices 
and the principles and indicators of the modern Rule of Law must always take into account what I 
would call the general facts established, if only provisionally, by the humanities and the social 
sciences. Among these facts are those which relate to the true role played by political parties 
within the processes of contemporary processes of representative democracy; those that have to 
do with the situation of vulnerable persons who are or have been imprisoned, migrants, stateless 
individuals, or members of national minorities or an indigenous people, to give but a few 
examples. So much for the “how.” There remains the “who” ― the question of whose role it is to 




Together with ius gentium, of which they ought to be regarded as a component, the global 
standards of constitutional law constitute a substantive source of law that is only an indirect 
product of the formal sources of positive law. More precisely, it is a metasource, that is to say a 
source that can encompass others, among which one might expect to find legal scholarship. To be 
sure, the scholars, who are largely responsible for the principled reconstruction of the modern 
Rule of Law, do contribute to it. For now, however, it is not they, but international or national 
state organs that employ the standardizing method. The work of the Select Committee on the 
Constitution of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords is certainly an interesting case. The 
standards which can be derived from its opinions have recently been codified by the members of 
the Constitution Unit of the Univerity College London.244 But foremost among the standards 
researchers are a broad advisory organ of the Council of Europe, the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission); a mixed organ of the Venice Commission, 
the Counsil for Democratic Elections; and the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights.  
 
When it was created in 1990, the Venice Commission was tasked with offering constitutional 
assistance to Central European nations, a mission expanded to the new republics of Eastern 
Europe the following year, with the fall of the USSR. While that mission remains crucial, the 
Commission’s work has expanded into new areas substantively as well geographically. The 
Venice Commission now advises not only on constitutional matters in the strict sense of the 
word, but also on subjects having to do with the judiciary, elections, referenda, and political 
parties. Among its members, an increasing number of Western and Northern Europe have 
resorted to its services. Orginally set up by a partial agreement among 18 member states of the 
Council of Europe, it is, since 2002, when all of the member states joined it, governed by a 
broadened agreement which allows non-European states to become full members, so that its work 
                                                
244 See Jack Simson Caird, Robert Hazell and Dawn Oliver, The Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution, The Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London, 
2014, online: <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/publications/tabs/reports/edit/unit-publications/159>. 
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increasingly tends to reflect a global, rather a merely European, constitutional heritage. In 
addition to the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, the Commission has 12 additional 
members (for a total of 59): Marocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, Kirghizistan, Kazakhstan, South 
Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Chili, Peru, and the United States.245 Belarus has the status of an associate 
member; Argentina, Canada, Uruguay, Japan, and the Vatican that of observers. South Africa, the 
Palestinian Authority, and the European Commission have a special status. Most often after 
considering, patiently and prudently, multiple ad hoc opinions, the Commission has produced a 
number of reference documents on general subjects such as: constitutional amendment246 ; 
secession 247 ; federated entities and international treaties 248 ; the role of parliamentary 
opposition 249 ; the imperative mandate 250 ; legislative second chambers 251 ; parliamentary 
immunities252; the choice of election dates 253; legislative initiative254; election law255; referendum 
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Constitutional Law, CDL-INF(2000)002, online: <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
INF(2000)002-e>. 
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<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL(2013)043.aspx >; Report on the regime of parliamentary 
immunity, CDL-INF(1996)007, online : <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-INF(1996)007.aspx 
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253 European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Report on choosing the date of an 
election, CDL-AD(2007)037, online : <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2007)037.aspx>. 
254 European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Report on Legislative Initiative, CDL-
AD(2008)035, online : <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2008)035.aspx>. 
255 Venice Commission, Electoral Matters, supra note 193; European Commission for democracy through law 
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AD(2005)012.aspx>; European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Interpretative 
Declaration on the Stability of the Electoral Law, CDL-AD(2005)043, online : 
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law256; law relative to political parties257; judicial appointments258 and the composition of 
constitutional courts259; judicial indepedence260; individual access to constitutional justice261; the 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2005)043.aspx>; European Commission for democracy 
through law (Venice Commission), Report on Electoral Law and Electoral Administration in Europe -Synthesis 
study on recurrent challenges and problematic issues, CDL-AD(2006)018, online : < 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2006)018.aspx>; European Commission for democracy 
through law (Venice Commission), Election Evaluation Guide, CDL-AD(2006)021, online : < 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2006)021.aspx>; European Commission for democracy 
through law (Venice Commission), Comparative Report on thresholds and other features of electoral systems which 
bar parties from access to Parliament, CDL-AD(2008)037, online : 
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2008)037.aspx>; European Commission for democracy 
through law (Venice Commission), Guidelines on Media Analysis during Election Observation Missions), CDL-
AD(2009)031, online : < http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2009)031.aspx>; European 
Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Report on the cancellation of election result, CDL-
AD(2009)054, online : < http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2009)054.aspx>; European 
Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Guidelines on an internationally recognised status of 
election observers, CDL-AD(2009)059, online : <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-
AD(2009)059.aspx>; European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Report on 
Thresholds and other features of electoral systems which bar parties from access to Parliament (II), CDL-
AD(2010)007, online : <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2010)007.aspx>; European 
Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Report on the timeline and inventory of political 
criteria for assessing an election, CDL-AD(2010)037, online : 
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2010)037.aspx>; European Commission for democracy 
through law (Venice Commission), Report on figure based management of possible election fraud, CDL-
AD(2010)043, online : <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2010)043.aspx>; European 
Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), Report on out-of-country voting, CDL-AD(2011)022 
online: <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2011)022.aspx>; European Commission for 
democracy through law (Venice Commission), Declaration of Global Principles for non-partisan election 
observation and monitoring by citizen organizations and Code of Conduct for non-partisan citizen election observers 
and monitors - Commemorated 3 April 2012 at the United Nations, New York - Initiated by the Global Network of 
Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM), CDL-AD(2012)018, online : 
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execution of the decisions of constitutional courts262; human rights in emergency situations263; 
counter-terrorism264; the freedom of peaceful assembly265; the freedoms of expression and 
religion266; the representation and political participation of women267; the political participation 
of people with disabilities268; national minorities members’ rights269; democratic control over 
armed forces and security services270 ; video-surveillance271; and private military and security 
                                                                                                                                                        
System: Part II - the Prosecution Service, CDL-AD(2010)040, online : 
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AD(2010)022.aspx>. 
265 European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), OSCE/ODIHR – Venice Commission 
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firms.272 So much for the participants in the direct production of the global standards of 
constitutional law. 
 
Let us now consider the participants in their indirect production, that is to say the formal sources 
of law ― legislation and case law. It is constitutional legislation and case law that we focus on 
here. The more the output of the world’s constitution-makers and constitutional courts 
substantially converges, more precisely, the more it converges in the direction of a greater 
conformity to international law, as well as system of principles of the modern Rule of Law, the 
easier the scientific work of ascertainment of global standards of constitutional law becomes.  
 
Jackson observes that, “[a]lthough scholarly work in recent years has begun to focus more 
attention on legislators both as constitution-makers and as constitutional interpreters, empirical 
work has not kept pace with theoretical developments.”273 Among the rare examples of empirical 
research on the activity of the world’s constitution-makers, Law and Versteeg’s study deserves to 
be highlighted, although it is important to keep in mind that it largely focused on the 
entrenchment of rights, and only incidentally considered structural provisions. Law and Versteeg 
came to the following general conclusions. First, the influence of the Constitution of the United 
States on the world’s constitution-makers is in decline, notably since the 1990s, although it could 
have been expected that it would continue to serve as a model at that point, as numerous nations 
of Central and Eastern Europe gave themselves new constitutions, while others, in Africa and 
Asia, undertook revisions to theirs.274 Second, while the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, contained in Part I of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, is more in step with the 
prevailing global constitutional standards, it is at best a culturally hegemonic model, appealing to 
common law countries, rather than a globally hegemonic model similar to what the American 
Constitution once was.275 Third, with the possible exception of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, no international or regional instrument seems to play this role of hegemonic 
model (at the regional or global scale). Fourth, this general polycentrism of the influence 
exercised by national constitutions and international and regional instruments on constitution-
makers suggests that the global standards of constitutional law relative to fundamental rights 
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follow a principled evolutionary logic, a dynamic, a groundswell, which increasingly tends to 
favour civil and political rights, at the expense of economic, social, and cultural rights.276 Fifth, 
the evolutionary dimension of the global standards of constitutional law thus revealed, it becomes 
easy to see why the old and rigid (and hence only rarely modified)277 Constitution of the United 
States is losing its influence.278 While it is true that, the more the output of the world’s 
constitution-makers substantively converges in the direction of a greater conformity to the 
principled system of the modern Rule of Law, the easier the scientific work of ascertaining global 
standards of constitutonal law becomes, it remains the case that, the closer a given constitution is 
to these standards, the more likely it is to be influential abroad, not only with constitution-makers 
but also with judges.  
 
Some constitutional or supreme courts, or indeed individual judges, contribute more than others 
to the convergence, the “cross-pollination”279 of the world’s constitutional jurisprudences towards 
a better implementation of the modern Rule of Law. Paragraph 39(1)(c) of the South African 
Constitution, for example, expressly provides that any “court, tribunal or forum” competent to 
apply the Bill of Rights “may consider foreign law.” Such an express authorization undoubtedly 
represents the most obvious and best-known case of the fertilization of one jurisprudence by 
others, but it is far from being the only one.280 On the one hand, taking foreign law into account 
as a substantive source of law is a common judicial practice, which developed without any 
express authorization. For example, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council largely resorted 
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increasingly peripheral role in that process. No evolutionary process favors a species that is frozen in time. At least 
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279 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Global Community of Courts”, (2003) 44:1 Harv Int’l LJ 191 at 194-204. 
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to it in the constitutional law of federalism.281 On the other hand, judges do not always cite or 
reference the foreign sources from which they borrow, whether they are specifically authorized to 
do so or not, their “prudential silence” thus starting a “silent dialogue.”282  
 
In collaboration with the Venice Commission’s Joint Council on Constitutional Justice, this 
cross-pollination of constitutional jurisprudences is promoted and supported by initiatives such as 
the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, as well as associations of constitutional judges 
such as that of francophone constitutional courts, the Association des cours constitutionnelles 
ayant en partage l’usage du français (ACCPUF). Indeed, the ACCPUF is a manifestation of a 
broader phenomenon of the emergence or, by now, even of the consolidation of what Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has aptly called a global community of courts.283 This phenomenon is not so much 
institutional as cultural or, more accurately, an element of the judges’ professional 
consciousness.284 But even if it is true that it contributes to the (re)generation of a “global legal 
system,”285 we would do well to understand it, with Waldron’s help, as ius gentium of second-
order positivity.  
 
In 1989, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the German Grundgesetz, the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, William Rehnquist, said: 
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising the power of judicial review had 
no precedents to look to save their own, because our courts alone exercised this sort of authority. When 
many new constitutional courts were created after the Second World War, these courts naturally 
looked to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States … But now that constitutional law is 
solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the 
decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process. The United States 
courts, and legal scholarship in our country generally, have been somewhat laggard in relying on 
comparative law and decisions of other countries. But I predict that with so many thriving 
constitutional courts in the world today... that approach will be changed in the near future.286  
It is notorious that this prediction did not come true.287 Referring to foreign law in constitutional 
cases can even amount to something “dangerous,” according to Justice Scalia, who took this 
position in a dissenting judgment which Chief Justice Rehnquist actually joined.288 The relatively 
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closed character of the constitutional jurisprudence adds itself to the relative obsolescence of the 
Constitution as a cause of the decline of influence of the American constitutional law, which even 
tends to serve increasingly as an anti-model, a bank of dissuasive precedents.289 
 
* 
*    * 
 
With the new science of constitutional law as ius gentium and comparative constitutional law, the 
method of global standards of constitutional law will meet various resisting forces. According to 
Waldron, what truly separates those who oppose the consideration of foreign law and those who 
promote it is not the gap between the parochialism of the former and the cosmopolitanism of the 
latter group, but rather that between law conceived as will and law conceived as reason. As 
reason ultimately remains faith, we can say, paradoxically, that the main force resisting the notion 
of global standards of constitutional law is the lack of faith… in legal reason. Indeed, Roberto 
Unger’s quip is well-known: with the emergence of the Critical Legal Studies movement, the 
legal profession became “like a priesthood that had lost their faith and kept their jobs.”290 That 
movement’s purported contribution was to have done away with the faith. 
 
Yet as Tamanaha reminds us, “[t]he legal profession … is located at the crux of the rule of law.  
… [T]he rule of law could not conceivably function without this group committed to the values 
of legality.”291 But how can the jurists express a professional commitment to values? The best 
answer, in my view, is to be found in Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs and Waldron’s comments 
on it. Law is a domain of politics, and thus of morality, and thus of ethics. But it is a specialized 
domain. The “softness” of legal science and the disagreements that ripple through it do not 
compel (internal) scepticism. Although different from pure politics or philosophy, legal science 
nevertheless remains a normative one. A broad view of legal positivism takes this into account, 
without yet ignoring the specificity of the law’s “moral” issues.292 
                                                
289 See Klug, supra note 153. 
290 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, “The Critical Legal Studies Movement”, (1983) 96:3 Harv L Rev 561 at 675. 
291 See Tamanaha, supra note 174, at 59. Tamanaha adds that “[t]his position, however, also renders the legal 
profession, judges in particular, uniquely situated to undermine the rule of law.” 
292 See Waldron, “Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs”, supra note 61, at 23 (arguing that “the part of morality that is law – 
the part of morality that deals with the moral significance of past political events like precedents and enactments – 
sometimes to consider the enactment of unjust statutes and the making of perverse or unfair decisions. It has to 
respond to political events that are unfortunate and that may have an impact on what is now morally required which 
we wish were not the case. Just because law is a branch of morality, it does not follow that what the law requires is 
morally perfect or never morally regrettable”), 25 (arguing that “[t]he claim that law is part of morality does not 
require us to say that bad laws are not laws at all, or that bad laws are really good laws if only we could see. It does 
require us to say that in most cases when we are faced with enactments and precedents that morally frowns upon, we 
still have to try to figure out their significance along with all the rest of the corpus juris for our moral obligations”) 
and 26 (arguing that “[m]aybe there are some laws that are so murderously wrong in their character that they have no 
impact on the moral situation at all – except to generate an obligation to resist them”).  
